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Interested in getting published in the Gettysburg College
Journal of the Civil War Era?
If you or anyone you know has written an undergraduate
essay in the past five years on the Civil War Era or its legacy,
visit our website at http://cupola.gettysburg.edu/gcjwe/ to
enter have your work considered for next year’s volume of
the journal. Please review the following requirements and
categories for publication.
Publication Requirements and Categories
Submissions should be typed in 12-point Times New Roman
font and submitted as a Word document.
1. Academic Essays: We are interested in original research
making extensive use of primary and secondary sources.
Possible topics include, but are not limited to: military
history, social history, race, reconstruction, memory,
reconciliation, politics, foreign affairs, the home front,
etc. 6,000 words or less.
2. Book Reviews: Any nonfiction Civil War-related book
published in the last two years. Authors should have
knowledge of the relevant literature for review. 700
words or less.
3. Historical Nonfiction Essays: This category is for works
of nonfiction surrounding the Civil War that are not
necessarily of academic in nature. Examples include
essays in public history of the war, study of re-enactment
culture, current issues in Civil War memory such as the
sesquicentennial, etc. Creativity is encouraged in this
i

category as long as it remains a nonfiction piece. 2,000
to 6,000 words.
Anyone with an interest in the Civil War may submit their
work, including graduate students and independent scholars,
as long as the submission is undergraduate work written
within the past five years. If your submission is selected,
your work will be published online and in a print journal,
which you will receive a copy of for your own enjoyment.
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Letter from the Editors
It is our pleasure to present the eleventh volume of the
Gettysburg College Journal of the Civil War Era. This
volume contains four academic essays, on topics ranging
from battlefield mistakes to bluegrass music. The journal
begins with C. W. Claiborne’s “Analyzing the Interpretation
of the Civil War in Bluegrass Music.” This well-researched
essay explores themes of reconciliation and emancipation in
bluegrass music, as well as a consideration of how
Confederate nostalgia became associated with the region of
Appalachia. Second, Michael R. D. Connolly examines the
relationship between Confederate officials and the Canadian
people in “‘Good Neighbourhood’: Canada and America’s
Contentious Relationship during the Civil War”. Third,
Samantha Kramer investigates Ulysses S. Grant’s actions at
the Battle of Cold Harbor to determine the historical
accuracy of his reputation in “Heaven Hung in Black:
Grant’s Reputation and the Mistakes at Cold Harbor”.
Finally, Ethan Wagner evaluates one the worst civilian
incidents of the Civil War in “Pittsburgh’s Explosive
Mystery: A New Holistic Study of the Allegheny Arsenal
Tragedy”, a compelling essay to conclude this issue.
Each year, the submissions to our journal improve
dramatically, highlighting developments in the field of Civil
War history and the continuing passion of students around
the globe. Identifying the final pieces out of the dozens of
well-written and deeply-researched submissions was a
challenge which was only overcome by the hard work of our
dedicated associate editors. Their commitment and
consistency is commendable and we would like to thank
them here: Sophia R. Crawford ’24, James Douglas Duke
’24, Jaeger R. Held ’22, Emily R. Jumba ’24, Stefany A.
Kaminski ’24, Emma Monzeglio ’24, Abigail Seiple ’23,
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and Peter Wildgruber ’24. We would also like to thank
faculty advisor Prof. Ian Isherwood ’00 for his constant
guidance and support of student work. Finally, we also thank
Musselman Library’s scholarly communications librarian,
Mary Elmquist, for her dedication to making student
scholarship accessible.
We hope that this journal will offer our readers a
unique view into several important issues and events of the
Civil War Era. We are incredibly proud of our editorial team
as well as this year’s authors, who offer their brilliance in the
pages of this volume. We look forward to their future
contributions to the Civil War field. Please enjoy this volume
of the Gettysburg College Journal of the Civil War Era.
Sincerely,
Cameron T. Sauers ’21
Christopher T. Lough ’22
Brandon R. Neely ‘23
Editors-in-Chief
Gettysburg College Journal of the Civil War Era
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ANALYZING THE INTERPRETATION OF
THE CIVIL WAR IN BLUEGRASS MUSIC
C. W. Claiborne | North Carolina State University
The Civil War has had a lasting impact on all facets of
American society and culture, but one of its more counterintuitive results was its influence on bluegrass and the
musical memories of generations of bluegrass fans. Though
several studies have investigated the war’s role in country
music, 1 none have focused specifically on its role in bluegrass. This is especially pertinent given the divisive nature
of the war’s legacy in Appalachia, where much of bluegrass
music originated in the mid-twentieth century. Bluegrass has
typically viewed the Civil War through a reconciliationist
lens, focusing on themes that fit well within the bluegrass
idiom—such as separation from one’s homeland or the loss
of one’s family—rather than the genesis and other
ramifications of the war. Moreover, the racial and social
volatility of the 1960s led to an increase in Confederate
nostalgia and identification with the Old South in bluegrass
music. While this pro-Confederate wave has since been
replaced by a return to reconciliationist themes, there also

1
See, e.g., Andrew K. Smith and James E. Akenson, “The Civil War in
Country Music Tradition,” in Country Music Goes to War, eds. Charles
K. Wolfe and James E. Akenson (Lexington, KY: University Press of
Kentucky, 2005), 1-25; Phoebe Strom, “Defining Dixie: Southern
Political Discourse in Country Music,” Rhodes Institute for Regional
Studies, Rhodes College, 2013.
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exists a growing body of work with emancipationist
messages.
The interpretation of the Civil War in bluegrass is
also of interest due to the genre’s musicological origins. A
modern reinterpretation of traditional folk music, blended
with elements of country, jazz, and gospel, bluegrass has
often been defined by its conservatism. When gospel music
began shifting to a more pop-based approach in the late
1940s and early 1950s, acolytes of traditional, unadorned
gospel singing flocked to the burgeoning bluegrass scene.
Accordingly, bluegrass has remained more openly religious
than perhaps any other genre not formally tied to a
confession. Its conservative tenor famously led urban folk
artists to supplant bluegrass with their own brands of
“popular folk” and blues in the 1960s. 2 But the popularity of
bluegrass on college campuses in the same decade, along
with the development of “folknik” communities and the
“newgrass” movement of the late 1970s and early 1980s,
worked to introduce a new wave of anti-establishment (often
non-Southern) mindsets. This led some fundamentalists,
including Don Pierce, longtime owner of the label Starday
Records, to eschew bluegrass for its association with “people
of doubtful loyalty.” 3 As such, bluegrass has found relatively

2
Jens Lund and R. Serge Denisoff, “The Folk Music Revival and the
Counter Culture: Contributions and Contradictions,” The Journal of
American Folklore 84, no. 334 (1971): 401-02.
3
Quoted in Jens Lund, “Fundamentalism, Racism, and Political Reaction
in Country Music,” in The Sounds of Social Change, eds. R. Serge
Denisoff and Richard A. Peterson (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1972), 90.
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recent popularity with both conservative and progressive
audiences, in a musical as well as a political sense.
The mountain origins of bluegrass are equally
important to this investigation. While the popular narrative
of its emergence from Appalachia is oversimplified, it is true
that the earliest bluegrass musicians and much of its source
material originated in the rural mountain regions of the
former Confederacy. Interestingly, many of these enclaves
housed strong pockets of Southern Unionism during the
Civil War, though these feelings were not universal. Given
that the birthplace of bluegrass tended prominently toward
Unionist sentiment compared to the remainder of the South,
the fact that the genre later took to Confederate nostalgia
becomes all the more surprising.
Before analyzing bluegrass itself, we must first
examine the role of the Civil War in the musical forms that
preceded it. Since more than fifth of the material in the
bluegrass repertoire is drawn from the well of American folk
music, it is important to understand how the conflict was
received in folk songs. 4 Additionally, it is important to
examine how the genre typically known as “hillbilly music”
interpreted the war, as bluegrass is generally understood to
be an outgrowth of this movement.
The Civil War in Folk Music: 1861-1945
Folk music from the Civil War, whether songs invented by
soldiers on the march or popular music known by entire
L. Mayne Smith, “An Introduction to Bluegrass,” The Journal of
American Folklore 78, no. 309 (1965): 250.

4
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armies, had a decidedly mixed impact on Appalachian
repertoires. Despite the war’s destructive consequences in
the region, folklorist Newman Ivey White noted in 1952, “It
seems strange that there are so few Civil War ballads in the
mountains.” 5 Indeed, if one takes western North Carolina as
representative, songs relating to the Civil War did not seem
to comprise an overly important part of mountain repertoires
in the early and mid-twentieth century. White’s Frank C.
Brown Collection of North Carolina Folklore found only
“half a dozen pieces” stemming directly from the war. 6
The Brown collection illustrates the complicated
history of Confederate loyalty in Appalachia and the ways
mountain residents interpreted the Civil War. A song like
Pearl Webb’s “Drummer Boy of Shiloh” from 1921 fit well
within the existing body of mountain folk music, which has
long valorized family values, as well as ballads of violent
death and murder. 7 The lyrics neglect to specify which side
the drummer boy fought for, focusing instead on his death.
They detail his hopes of finding an eternal resting place: “He
raised his eyes and clasped his hands / And prayed before he
died.” The song also centers the impact of a fellow soldier’s
death on his surviving unit: “Each soldier wept like a child /
Stout heart and brave they were.” 8 Similar motifs can be
found in I. G. Greer’s 1913 rendition of “The Last Fierce
The Frank C. Brown Collection of North Carolina Folklore, ed.
Newman Ivey White (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1952), 289.
6
Brown Collection, 488.
7
Smith, “An Introduction to Bluegrass,” 249.
8
Pearl Webb, “Drummer Boy of Shiloh,” collected 1921, in Brown
Collection, 537.
5
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Charge” (also known as “The Two Soldiers”), though this
song features explicitly partisan lyrics. In cases such as
these, words such “Rebel” or “Yankee” could easily be
interchanged with one another when adjusting for syllable
and meter. 9 This agrees with Phoebe Strom’s recent claim
that Appalachian war songs “transcended the boundaries of
North and South” to describe a common experience on either
side of the Mason-Dixon. 10
Also worthy of note are the remakes of preexisting
folk songs undertaken during the Civil War itself. Smith and
Akenson cite the reworking of popular songs on the part of
both Confederate and Union soldiers. In particular they note
a Confederate reskin of “The Yellow Rose of Texas,” which
laments the defeat of General John Bell Hood and the
recapture of Nashville in 1864: “You may talk about your
Beauregard / And sing of General Lee / But the gallant Hood
of Texas / Played hell in Tennessee.” 11 In a similar vein, a
Union parody of “Just Before the Battle, Mother” mocks
Rebel soldiers for “drinking mountain dew” and contains
verses on Confederate desertion. 12 The Brown collection
lists parallel examples, such as an adaptation of a
seventeenth-century broadside entitled “The Soldier’s

I. G. Greer, “The Two Soldiers,” collected 1913, in Brown Collection,
539-40.
10
Strom, “Defining Dixie,” 8.
11
“The Yellow Rose of Texas,” collection year unknown, in Country
Music Goes to War, 3; Smith and Akenson, “The Civil War in the
Country Music Tradition,” 3-4.
12
“Just Before the Battle, Mother,” collection year unknown, in Country
Music Goes to War, 4.
9
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Wooing,” in which a rich father disapproves of his
daughter’s engagement to a poor young soldier. 13
Mountaineers could also compose their own songs
about the war, though this was generally less common than
reworking preexisting songs; additionally, few of these
original songs were ever transcribed of recorded. Speaking
of what he termed such “native” American songs, folk music
historian D. K. Wilgus notes that “few old ballads native to
the area have survived.” 14 One example of a Civil War folk
song that did survive, however, is “Going Across the
Mountain,” recorded by Frank Proffitt in 1962. Written by
Proffitt’s grandfather, Wiley Proffitt, the song is distinctly
pro-Union in nature: “Going across the mountain / To join
the boys in blue.” In spite of this, the lyrics focus primarily
on the war’s impact on the lives of soldiers and their families
rather than partisanship. 15
As indicated above, Appalachian repertoires featured
an amalgam of material with varying degrees of pro- and
anti-Union sentiment. The extent of Confederate sympathy
in mountain folk music can best be summed up with the song
“The Texas Ranger,” collected in Boone, North Carolina in
the early twentieth century. “The Texas Ranger” originally
detailed an unspecified conflict between American Indians
and White settlers in Texas; through the process of oral
13
Maude Sutton, “The Soldier’s Wooing,” collection year unknown, in
Brown Collection, 289.
14
D. K. Wilgus, “Country-Western Music and the Urban Hillbilly,” The
Journal of American Folklore 83, no. 328 (1970): 159.
15
Frank Proffitt, “Going Across the Mountain,” Frank Proffitt, FolkLegacy Records FSA-1, 1962, vinyl.
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transmission, the army was transferred from its typical route
toward San Antonio and the Rio Grande, and instead
“marched from Western Texas / to old Virginia’s Land,”
trading “Injuns” for “Yankees” and arrow for bullets. 16
The representation of the Civil War in mountain folk
music was therefore anything but unified. Musicians drew
on a variety of sources and modified songs as they saw fit,
reflecting the varied opinions on the war in Appalachia. The
region was sharply divided between three groups: Unionists,
Confederates, and those who felt the war did not apply to
them. 17 The development of folk music also reflects how
many residents of Appalachia felt about the loss of the
Confederacy, as many cared more about the lived experience
of the war’s impact rather than ideological considerations.
All this changed with the Tin Pan Alley era of music
production in the 1870s. The trend of popular music
glorifying Southern culture began with Stephen Foster in the
years just before the Civil War and reached its apex in the
following decades. Phoebe Strom, summarizing the work of
music historian Bill C. Malone, argues that this obsession
with antebellum Southern life was an attempt to “mediate
deep societal rifts along economic, racial, and regional
lines,” adding that “the longing to return to Dixie evident in
so many of these songs likely expresses a wish for the first

16
“The Texas Ranger,” collection year unknown, in Brown Collection,
545-46.
17
Wilma A. Dunaway, “Civil War in the Mountain South,” Slavery and
Emancipation in the Mountain South: Evidence, Sources, and Methods
(Virginia Tech Faculty Archives, 2013).
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southern migrants, especially black migrants, to leave the
North.” 18
These themes continued through the late 1920s,
when hillbilly music first entered on the national scene. The
first recorded example of what is now commonly referred to
as a hillbilly musician appeared in 1929, with Eck Robertson
and Henry Gilliland recording multiple sides for the
begrudging Victor Talking Machine Company. Much has
been made about the roots of early hillbilly musicians and
their ties to the Confederacy—Robertson and Gilliland even
purportedly arrived at their first recording session clad in
Confederate dress uniforms, as they had just attended a
Confederate veteran’s reunion. Similarly, popular old-time
fiddler Fiddlin’ John Carson was a noted member of the Ku
Klux Klan, and frequently preformed at fiddlers’
conventions organized by the United Daughters of the
Confederacy. Yet several historians have downplayed these
connections; in Smith and Akenson’s summation,
“Conventions of old Rebel soldiers and fiddlers sometimes
went hand in hand,” not because they necessarily supported
one another, but because their participants often tended to
overlap. 19
More difficult to ignore, however, were the political
activities of many early hillbilly artists. After the 1915
lynching of Leo Frank, a Jewish factory worker and
suspected murderer of Mary Phagan in Atlanta, Fiddlin’
18
19

7.

Strom, “Defining Dixie,” 6-7.
Smith and Akenson, “The Civil War in the Country Music Tradition,”

9
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John Carson reportedly took to the steps of the city
courthouse and sang, “The Christian doors of heaven have
sent Leo Frank to hell;” this eventually became the folk
ballad “Little Mary Phagan.” Carson’s case was hardly
unique; populist politicians of the 1910s often used
traditional music to draw rural support, 20 and old-time
fiddling was widely employed in the campaigns of radical
politicians, including “Pitchfork” Ben Tillman and the
White supremacist James K. Vardman. 21 Even more
indicative of hillbilly musicians’ conservative leanings were
the topical anti-evolution songs of the 1920s, such as Vernon
Dalhart’s 1925 song “The John T Scopes Trial: The Old
Religion’s Better After All.” Written following the titular
“monkey trial,” which saw populist politician William
Jennings Bryan represent the state of Tennessee, Dalhart’s
lyrics railed against evolution and the removal of God from
public schoolhouses. 22 A rash of similar hillbilly songs,
including Uncle Dave Macon’s “The Bible’s True” from
1926, were published around the same time. 23
Fundamentalist songs like Dalhart’s, as well as proSouth songs such as Uncle Dave Macon’s “I’se Gwine Back
to Dixie” from 1927, undoubtedly sold well among the rural
audiences they targeted; however, these songs did not
Lund, “Fundamentalism, Racism, and Political Reaction in Country
Music,” 83.
21
Stein, “Living Right and Being Free,” 9.
22
Vernon Dalhart, “The John T. Scopes Trial (The Old Religion’s Better
After All),” track A1 on The John T. Scopes Trial (The Old Religion’s
Better After All), Edison Records 51609-R, 1925, vinyl.
23
Uncle Dave Macon, “The Bible’s True,” track A1 on The Bible’s True,
Vocalion 15322, 1926, vinyl.
20
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necessarily represent the ideals of Appalachian audiences. 24
Instead, they were often performances required by artists’
record labels, who believed such songs would sell based on
the popular “race-based” music advertising techniques of the
time. As Phoebe Strom has written, “Hillbilly music was far
less overtly pro-Southern than the mainstream music of the
time,” adding that the shoehorning of musicians to play
stereotypically Southern songs was caused by a “preestablished and widely popular conception of tradition.” 25
As can be seen, “native” Appalachian folk music
focused primarily on the hardships of the Civil War and its
impact on people’s daily lives; it was hillbilly music that
initiated the overt glorification of the Old South. Neither,
however, focused greatly on the war, concentrating instead
on the lives of common people and how the war changed
traditional lifestyles. Hillbilly musicians and Tin Pan Alley
songwriters in particular often focused on plantation life or
the old homestead while neglecting to mention slavery or
other issues surrounding the Civil War. With a review of the
war’s impact on the two main genres that lyrically preceded
bluegrass music, the reception of the Civil War in bluegrass
can be more clearly understood.
The Civil War in Bluegrass: 1945-2000
The music of the “classic” ensemble of Bill Monroe and His
Bluegrass Boys, which first formed in 1938, has set the
Uncle Dave Macon, “I’se Gwine Back to Dixie,” track A1 on I’se
Gwine Back to Dixie, Vocalion 5157, 1927, vinyl.
25
Strom, “Defining Dixie,” 6; 8.
24
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repertoire for every bluegrass musician to follow, with many
of his early releases becoming “standards” of the genre.
Though an outgrowth of hillbilly music—due in part to the
genre’s movement toward pop in the 1940s—bluegrass
heavily relied on one thematic element of hillbilly music in
particular: songs focusing on the singer’s rural home, and
especially those that yearned nostalgically for a home now
lost. 26 This is of prime importance, as the migration of
Appalachian farmers to urban areas during the Great
Depression and the Second World War was a major factor in
development of the bluegrass idiom. As historian and
musician Steve Watt has put it, “Bluegrass is not the music
of Appalachian farmers… It is the music of these people and
their descendants who have been forced off their farms.” 27
Bluegrass also continued to rely on themes already
popular in Appalachian folk music, including death, the
daily struggle of life, and salvation. A look into Bill Monroe’s early discography immediately reveals each one of
these values, with “Mule Skinner Blues” being a work song,
“True Life Blues” and “Rocky Road Blues” focusing on the
struggles of daily life, and “Shake Mother’s Hand” and “I’m
Traveling On” carrying religious messages. Moreover, “I’m
Going Back to Old Kentucky” represents the bluegrass
artist’s longing for return to a rural lifestyle.
As these songs indicate, bluegrass was initially a
music of enduring the present and yearning for the past. As
Smith, “An Introduction to Bluegrass,” 249.
Steve Watt, “Letter to a (Hard-Driving) Bluegrass Band,” The Radical
Teacher 3 (1976): 32.
26
27
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such, bluegrass musicians would have no reason to honor the
Confederacy, despite their glorification of the South in
general. Though singers missed their old communities and
expressed those longings through music, the Confederacy,
along with similar topics such as slavery or plantation life,
were marginal in their collective memories. This is perfectly
logical; after all, it was the secession initiated by the planter
class that wrought such misery in the mountains, even as
Appalachia was a region noted for its distinct lack of slavery.
Early bluegrass songs focused instead on love, life, and
religion, rather than the Civil War. These themes were
followed by most every major bluegrass band in the genre’s
early years, continuing into the late 1950s and early 1960s.
In 1959, the folk movement began to zero in on
bluegrass music as its popular style of choice. The American
folk revival accepted bluegrass as a legitimate style of folk
for three reasons: first, most bluegrass instruments were
acoustic and unamplified; secondly, many of the songs
played by bluegrass bands were shared with the emerging
folk movement, as they were drawn from the broader folk
tradition; and finally, as bluegrass historian Neil Rosenberg
has written, the genre’s “instrumental styles… were seen as
exciting innovations based on folk styles.” 28 Shortly after the
folk movement discovered bluegrass, themes surrounding
the Civil War began cropping up in bluegrass songs.
The popularity of bluegrass with folk-based groups
was not directly responsible for the renewed emergence of
Neil Rosenberg, “From Sound to Style: The Emergence of Bluegrass,”
The Journal of American Folklore 80, no. 316 (1967): 149.

28
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Confederate imagery. Rather, it was brought about through
the creation of new war ballads by folk musicians. Former
history teacher and songwriter Jimmy Driftwood is credited
with the start of this movement after the release of his single
“The Battle of New Orleans” in 1959 and its subsequent
cover by Johnny Horton. Driftwood’s success led to a small
spate of folk-style historical ballads, most notably Johnny
Horton’s “Johnny Reb,” first written in by Merle Kilgore in
1959. 29 Driftwood capitalized on the moment with his
release of Songs of Billy Yank and Johnny Reb in 1961. 30
This album, along with Reno and Smiley’s Folk Songs of the
Civil War from the same year, marked a new era in bluegrass
music. 31 As Charles Wolfe has noted, “By the 1920s… Civil
War songs and storied were receding into the misty past.” 32
Yet the 1960s represented a new outgrowth of Civil War
music in bluegrass.
Also taking place in the late 1950s and early 1960s
was the chaos of the civil rights movement. Desegregation
led to a number of country songs appearing with anti-Black
and pro-segregation messages, largely from anonymous
musicians with names such as Johnny Reb or The Sons of
Mississippi. While this brand of segregationist music never
had a large impact on bluegrass, its connections with the rise
of “Southernization” in wider American culture, with
Wilgus, “Country-Western Music and the Urban Hillbilly,” 174-75.
Jimmy Driftwood, Songs of Billy Yank and Johnny Reb, RCA Victor
LPM-2316, 1961, vinyl.
31
Reno & Smiley, Folk Songs of the Civil War, King Records 756, 1961,
vinyl.
32
Charles Wolfe, “Bloody War,” in Country Music Goes to War, 26.
29
30
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Governor George Wallace of Alabama its most prominent
political leader, are undeniable. 33 While the movement can
only be briefly summarized here, the most basic outcome of
Southernization was a greater acceptance of the South as a
legitimate cultural region throughout the US, with the
Confederacy becoming representative of the South as a
whole through the use of Confederate imagery by proSouthern revisionists. 34 In short, the coalescence of civil
rights and the folk movement allowed Civil War memory to
become what Smith and Akenson succinctly termed “a
touchstone of white southern identity.” 35
This trend of Southernization explains why a peoplegroup who historically had weak ties to the Confederacy
have since become bound up with Confederate nostalgia.
Artists in the early 1960s were only one generation removed
from the “first generation” of bluegrass musicians who
migrated to the North and Midwest from Appalachia during
the Great Depression. Through the later 1960s, these new
musicians came of age in a world where the idea of the
Confederacy was widely used to represent the South. Thus,
the outgrowth of pro-Confederate songs during the civil
rights movement fit within the broader trend of artists
honoring their previous homelands, even if their ancestors
may not have been proponents of secession.

Stein, “Living Right and Being Free,” 26.
Strom, “Defining Dixie,” 21; Stein, “Living Right and Being Free,”
26-27.
35
Smith and Akenson, “The Civil War in the Country Music Tradition,”
19.
33
34
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One of the earliest bluegrass songs referencing the
Civil War that did not originate from a history-themed album
was recorded in May 1963. Lester Flatt and Earl Scruggs’
“Poor Rebel Soldier” perpetuates numerous tropes regarding
the Confederacy and Southern superiority as found in
revisionist history. The narrator first meets the Confederates
on a positive note: “We run Grant’s big army in the land
where it snows,” where soldiers are kept warm by the “hot
blood” running through their “rebel veins.” Later, however,
he deserts the army because he “Can’t find me no woman in
this Yankee land.” 36
The song went over well with the college folk scene.
Flatt and Scruggs first debuted “Poor Rebel Soldier” at
Vanderbilt University in Nashville, and their live recording
attests to the audience’s enthusiastic response. Though the
song does portray the Confederacy in a somewhat
unflattering light (the narrator’s desertion runs contrary to
popular claims regarding the staunch loyalty and honor of
Confederate soldiers), it does represent the first documented
instance of bluegrass artists recording Civil War song not for
explicitly historical purposes. It also represents the adoption
of a reconciliationist approach to the war among bluegrass
musicians that had previously been popular in folk music.
This interpretation of the war would remain popular in
bluegrass music until the late 1990s.
That bluegrass took on a largely reconciliationist
perspective—downplaying the realities of slavery while
Flatt & Scruggs, “Poor Rebel Soldier,” track B5 on Recorded Live at
Vanderbilt University, Columbia CL 2134, 1964, vinyl.
36
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emphasizing the devastations of war—makes sense given
the audiences that the genre catered to at the time. Chief
among these were the more liberal college crowd, who were
uninterested in hearing songs that overtly glorified the
South; the folk crowd, who simply wanted to hear songs that
sounded historical, regardless of their accuracy; and younger
Southerners, many of whom believed that the Civil War was
not fought over slavery due to popular revisionist arguments.
Bluegrass has always been a music rooted in a sense
of place. Musicians often hailed—and continue to hail—
from the South, especially the mountain South, with George
O. Carney finding in 1974 that approximately seventy
percent of bluegrass musicians came from below the MasonDixon line. 37 In the late 1950s, the folk movement first made
the Civil War an acceptable theme in bluegrass; at the same
time, reactionary conservative politics were working to
rebrand the South, drawing ties in the process to the
Confederacy. When one considers that the South became
conflated with the Confederacy metonymically, the growing
popularity of pro-Confederate ideology in bluegrass music
in the mid-1970s is easy to understand.
Taking a step back from bluegrass and examining
country music more holistically, Confederate imagery took
the genre by storm in the late 1960s and early 1970s,
especially in the new subgenres of Southern rock and outlaw
country. Both idioms “made the South the possession of a

George O. Carney, “Bluegrass Grows All Around: Spatial Dimensions
of a Country Music Style,” Journal of Geography 73, no. 4 (1974): 35.
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younger generation and a broader political base.” 38 As
several music historians have noted, by this time “Bluegrass
and Country-Western performances [had] converged in style
and repertory,” with bluegrass concurrently becoming more
open in terms of repertoire and expression of non-traditional
ideas. 39 This can largely be explained by the genre’s
expanding popularity outside the South with the openminded college festival crowd. During this period, bluegrass
saw a greater blending of styles but retained a proConfederate outlook on the Civil War due to the popular
Southernization tactics of the time.
One group dating from this era of greater outside
musical influence was Danny Davis and the Nashville Brass,
which began performing in 1968. Starting out as a country
band that incorporated brass alongside traditional country
instrumentation, Danny Davis epitomized the growing
fusion of genres and styles at the time. A self-described
Yankee from Randolph, Massachusetts, Davis spent years
convincing labels in Nashville that his blend of country and
brass would sell, but was instantly popular among country
and bluegrass fans alike once given the chance to record.
One of Davis’s songs, “From Dixie With Love” from 1972,
was a medley of “Dixie” and the “Battle Hymn of the
Republic.” 40 Combinations of Confederate songs with
patriotic ones were not uncommon; for instance, Mickey
Newberry’s “American Trilogy” from 1971 blended the
Strom, “Defining Dixie,” 37.
Rosenberg, “From Sound to Style,” 149.
40
Danny Davis and the Nashville Brass, “From Dixie With Love,” track
B3 on Live—In Person, RCA Victor LSP-4720, 1972, vinyl.
38
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same songs as “From Dixie With Love,” along with the
spiritual “All My Trials.” 41 These songs demonstrate the
reimagining of “Dixie” in the public mind, with many
Americans treating it as a patriotic song in praise of the US
as a whole, indicative of broader shifts in attitude towards
the Confederacy.
While a full study of “Dixie’s” reinterpretation is
beyond the scope of this article, it would be difficult to
discuss Confederate memory in bluegrass without at least
touching on the song. As can be heard in his introduction to
“From Dixie with Love,” Davis considers “Dixie” one of the
most popular songs in American history. According to Carl
Bryan Holmberg, as of the mid-1980s (and, to a certain
degree, likely into the present), “The song ‘Dixie’ still
produces enough impact that it is loved in many American
communities, especially in rural areas… the song’s music
has made its way into American psyches as a commonplace
for the ‘Southern’ way of life.” 42 This helps explain why
“Dixie” has often found its way into instrumental licks or
solos in songs that otherwise have no relevance to the
Confederacy.
A more recent example of “Dixie’s” status as a standin for the wider South is Bill Emerson’s “The Grey Ghost”
from 1987. 43 Emerson was inspired to write “The Grey
Mickey Newberry, “An American Trilogy,” track A1 on Frisco Mabel
Joy, Elektra EKS-74107, 1971, vinyl.
42
Carl B. Holmberg, “Toward the Rhetoric of Music: Dixie,” Southern
Speech Communication Journal 51, no. 1 (1985): 72.
43
Bill Emerson & Pete Goble, “The Grey Ghost,” Tennessee 1949,
Webco WLPS-0123, 1987, vinyl.
41
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Ghost” after learning that First Lieutenant Franklin
Williams, a member of John Singleton Mosby’s elusive band
of Confederate rangers, was born and raised near his home
in Fairfax Country, Virginia. When asked about his song’s
musical references to “Dixie,” Emerson verified Holmberg’s
point in writing, “I incorporated elements of ‘Dixie’ into
‘The Grey Ghost’ to lend it some authentic southern
flavor.” 44 Thus, bands incorporating “Dixie” into their music
did not necessarily do so out of Confederate sympathies
(though this should not be entirely excluded), but because
the song had become symbolic of the South rather than the
Confederacy alone. Further demonstrating this shift in
meaning is an episode from George Wallace’s presidential
campaign in 1964, when he visited Milwaukee and was
greeted by approximately three thousand factory workers
singing “Dixie” in Polish. Wallace later recalled a moment
after his speech when “one fine-looking man grabbed me
and said, ‘Governor, I have never been south of South
Milwaukee, but I am a Southerner.’” Wallace agreed; “Of
course he was.” 45
The late 1960s and early 1970s were the heyday of
Confederate imagery in bluegrass. Songs such “Atlanta Is
Burning” by The Boys From Indiana, 46 “Graycoat Soldiers”
by Norman Blake, 47 and “Legend of the Rebel Soldier” by
Bill Emerson, email message to the author, April 5, 2019.
Quoted in Stein, “Living Right and Being Free,” 26.
46
The Boys From Indiana, “Atlanta Is Burning,” Atlanta Is Burning,
King Bluegrass Records KB 530, 1974, vinyl.
47
Norman Blake, “Graycoat Soldiers,” track A5 on The Fields of
November, Flying Fish 004, 1974, vinyl.
44
45

20

Bluegrass Music
The Country Gentlemen 48 are just a few of the dozens of proConfederate songs released by prominent bluegrass artists.
Perhaps the song that most overtly glorified the Confederacy
was Bob Smallwood’s “Rebel Soldier (Your Memory Will
Never Die)” from 1975. The track opens with a question:
“Could there be any greater cause / Than the one you fought
for and lost?” and goes on to lament the deaths of several
prominent Confederate leaders. The lyrics also carry blatant
Lost Cause messages, stating, “Victory for you they said
could never be / But you’ll always be a winner to me.” 49
While many of the pro-Confederate songs released
during this era continued to reflect a reconciliationist attitude
toward the war—with Sherman’s March to the Sea a
particularly popular theme—their favoritism toward the
Confederacy was more marked than in previous years. By
the late 1970s, though, bluegrass artists’ interest in honoring
the Confederacy had gradually become less pronounced. In
1977, for instance, folk musician Bill Steele wrote the song
“Cedar Forest” about a Union soldier who deserts his
regiment during the “foolish… politician’s war,” searching
for a life of peace and contentment in marriage. 50 Similarly,
the McPeak Brothers’ “The Last Time” from 1978 details a

The Country Gentlemen, “The Legend of the Rebel Soldier,” track A2
on The Award Winning Country Gentlemen, Rebel Records SLP 1506,
1972, vinyl.
49
Bob Smallwood, “Rebel Soldier (Your Memory Will Never Die),”
track A1 on Rebel Soldier (Your Memory Will Never Die), Old
Homestead Records OHS 90030, 1975, vinyl.
50
Bill Steele, “The Cedar Forest,” track B2 on Chocolate Chip Cookies,
Swallowtail ST-7, 1977, vinyl.
48
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soldier’s separation from his wife and homeland. 51 The
following year saw the release of the Cache Valley Drifters’
“Masters/Dixieland Lady,” a medley focusing on the
separation of slave families prior to the Civil War and
destruction of (presumably White) homelife during the
war. 52
Another song that illustrates the public’s changing
attitudes toward the Confederacy is a medley from David
Pengelly’s 1977 release Recorded Live. Before playing an
instrumental blend of “Dixie” and “Marching Through
Georgia,” Pengelly asked his Decatur, Georgia audience,
“How many Yankees have we got in the audience tonight?”
He was predictably met with little enthusiasm. However,
when he followed up with the question, “How many Rebels
have we got here tonight?” the reaction was, though
somewhat more enthusiastic, nearly just as taciturn. The
medley itself began with a solo banjo rendition of “Dixie,”
which elicited little response. But the second (and notably
pro-Union) song immediately goaded the crowd to clap
along in unison; Pengelly then lost all momentum he had
gained by launching back into a slow version of “Dixie.” The
song’s closing was met with a polite yet restrained cheer
from the audience—perhaps half of the reaction to other

The McPeak Brothers, “The Last Time,” track B2 on Bend in the River,
County Records 711, 1978, vinyl.
52
The Cache Valley Drifters, “Masters/Dixieland Lady,” track A3 on
The Cache Valley Drifters, Flying Fish FF 081, 1979, vinyl.
51
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bluegrass numbers from his show such as “Rockytop” and
“Dueling Banjos/Foggy Mountain Breakdown.” 53
A decrease in Confederate sentiment through the late
1970s might not seem intuitive. After all, this was a period
when Georgia governor Jimmy Carter was elected President,
so-called “forced busing” was a hot-button political issue
across the nation, and The Dukes of Hazzard, with a
Confederate battle flag emblazoned on the roof of the Duke
brothers’ car, the General Lee, was the top-rated show on
television. Yet it was precisely this greater acceptance of the
South in American popular culture—similarly represented
by the expansion of major sports franchises into the South,
such as the NHL’s Atlanta Flames in 1972 and the NFL’s
Tampa Bay Buccaneers in 1976—that contributed to the
decline in Confederate imagery and the substitution of the
Confederacy for the South more broadly. Another reason for
bluegrass music’s distancing from the Lost Cause was the
public scrutiny faced by groups with overt Confederate
associations and the new labeling of Confederate symbols
and ideas as hateful.
Accordingly, as bluegrass progressed into the 1980s
and 1990s, the open lionization of the Confederacy became
increasingly uncommon. Though narrated from the
perspective of “Rebel soldiers… from Tennessee,” Larry
Sparks’ “Last Day at Gettysburg” from 1996 returns to more
typical reconciliationist themes, focusing on “The fires, the
dead, [and] the dying,” and evoking images of an “angel
David Pengelly, “Dixie/Marching Through Georgia,” track B1 on
Recorded Live, Shannon Records [no catalog number], 1977, vinyl.
53
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band” beckoning the soldier home. 54 In a similar vein, The
Seldom Scene’s “Dry Creek Run” from the same year tells
of the death and destruction wrought by the Civil War,
noting that the dead “weren’t just blue and they weren’t just
gray,” and that “Death took no sides when it came that
day.” 55
Bluegrass in the Twenty-First Century
The late 1990s and early 2000s largely reflected a softening
of Confederate sympathies, as well as an increased focus on
slavery and the Union. Released in 1998, Blue Highway’s
“He Walked All the Way Home” tells of a soldier who walks
home from the site of Lee’s surrender to his home in
Southampton County, Virginia. Though also told from a
Southern perspective, as indicated by the reference to
Appomattox Courthouse as the place “where the deed was
sadly done,” the song largely focuses on the “sadness [the
soldier wore] like a mantle for the friends he lost in vain.” 56
Also from this period is Kevin McClung’s 2003 song
“Tennessee,” which focuses on a soldier’s internal struggle
with leaving home for war. With lines such as “I can’t help
but feel strange / Heading north in a pouring rain,” the chorus

54
Larry Sparks, “Last Day at Gettysburg,” Blue Mountain Memories,
Rebel Records REB-CD-1726, 1996, CD.
55
The Seldom Scene, “Dry Creek Run,” track 1 on Dream Scene, Sugar
Hill Records SHCD-3858, 1996, CD.
56
Blue Highway, “He Walked All the Way Home,” Midnight Storm,
Rebel Records REB-CD-1746, 1998, CD.
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asks an angel to “Make sure I find my way back home / To
Tennessee” if the narrator dies. 57
One album that affords a unique look at the shifting
nature of Civil War memory in bluegrass is Lonesome
Ride’s 2002 album Crossing the Wall. This album is of
particular interest because it was created by bandleader Gary
G. Smith while researching his ancestor’s role in the war. It
is composed mostly of self-written songs, which include
themes such as soldiers longing for home, the disruption of
family life, and even a “brother-fighting-brother” song—a
theme popular in the Appalachian folk tradition. While it
neglects the African American perspective that has
increasingly found its way into bluegrass in recent years, it
does offer a relatively unbiased account of the war. This is
what makes Crossing the Wall so interesting: though it
perpetuates the old reconciliationist approach in its
avoidance of slavery, it contains little to no overt
glorification of the South, returning instead to themes of
wartime hardship. 58
Civil War songs in bluegrass slowed to a relative
trickle in the mid-2000s. This can be tied to a decrease in
public identification with the Confederacy since the 1970s,
as well as a general avoidance of the Confederacy in music
except among neo-Confederates, historical groups, or hate
groups. Since the late 2000s, however, a new wave of Civil
War bluegrass music has emerged. Liked in the 1960s, this
Kevin McClung, “Tennessee,” track 6 on Minor Indiscretions,
Mountain William Music [no catalog number], 2003, CD.
58
Lonesome Ride, Crossing the Wall, self-released, 2002, CD.
57
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second wave is likely due in part to heightened racial
tensions in American politics. Yet the new generation of
Civil War songs exhibits an increased diversity of lyrical
themes and a minimization of pro-Confederate viewpoints.
This has become even more important due to the weaking
hold of Southernization in American culture since the 1960s.
Even recent songs that sound pro-Confederate on the
surface, such as Balsam Range’s “Burning Georgia Down”
from 2007, were not typically written with the glorification
of the Confederacy in mind. Despite the song’s protagonist
referring to Union soldiers as “devils dressed in Blue,” 59
songwriter Mark Bumgardner wrote that he simply wanted
to “keep it historically accurate while having the story being
told from the perspective of someone who was there,” and
that he “didn’t want to make any political statement or pass
judgement by looking through the lens of history.” 60 Rather,
Bumgardner and co-writer Milan Miller sought to tell a story
of tragedy, sadness, and pain, using the Civil War as a
framework.
More representative of this newer batch of music is a
trio of songs from The SteelDrivers’ catalog, including their
2008 song “Sticks That Make Thunder” and their 2015 song
“River Runs Red.” The former is told from the neutral
perspective of a tree watching a battle unfold, using
dissociation to point out the senselessness of violence. The
tree recounts that “Some were the color of the sky in winter
Balsam Range, “Burning Georgia Down,” track 5 on Marching Home,
Mountain Home Music Company MH11422, 2007, CD.
60
Mark Bumgardner, email message to the author, April 10, 2019.
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/ Some were as blue as the night,” in reference to the gray
and blue of soldiers’ uniforms. It goes on to describe death
and destruction in natural terms, saying, “When the light
came again there was death on the wind / As the buzzards
made way for the worms.” 61 “River Runs Red” is less
esoteric, stating bluntly, “No winners or losers / When you
count the dead.” The song emphasizes that both sides
suffered tremendous losses: “Now Rogers was from
Alabama / And Thomas an old New York town / But soon
they would die like blood brothers / In the stream where their
souls would flow down.” 62
Both of these songs focus on the death and violence
wrought by war, furthering a reconciliationist understanding
of the Civil War in bluegrass. But The SteelDrivers followed
a more emancipationist path in 2010 with the song “Can You
Run,” which tells the story of a slave family watching the
advance of the Union Army. The lyrics directly attack the
slave society of the Old South: “Can you run to the freedom
line of the Lincoln soldiers / Where the contraband can be a
man? / […] Wrap these hands of mine around a gun / And
chase the taste of bondage from my tongue.” 63 Rhiannon
Giddens’ “Julie” from 2017 tells a similar story, but speaks
directly to the fears of Southern plantation owners over the
loss of their slaves. Giddens, who is African American,
61
The SteelDrivers, “Sticks That Make Thunder,” track 8 on The
SteelDrivers, Rounder Records 11661-0598-2, 2007, CD.
62
The SteelDrivers, “River Runs Red,” track 11 on The Muscle Shoals
Recordings, Rounder Records 11661-9180-2, 2015, CD.
63
The SteelDrivers, “Can You Run,” track 5 on Reckless, Rounder
Records 11661-0624-2, 2010, CD.
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stated in a 2015 interview that she drew inspiration for the
song from Andrew Ward’s book The Slaves’ War. 64
Another way “Julie” differs from “Can You Run” is
in its interaction between the slave and the plantation
owner’s wife, who tries to convince the slave not to flee. She
employs a rhetoric of familiarity and complacency, saying,
“You won’t go / Leave this house and all you know / […]
Don’t leave here / [Don’t] leave us, who love you, and all
you hold dear.” 65 Likewise, Giddens gives voice to antislavery themes in her song “At the Purchaser’s Option” from
2017, which tells of the breakup of enslaved families and
their endurance in spite of separation. The refrain declares,
“You can take my body / You can take my bones / You can
take my blood / But not my soul.” 66 Gidden and her former
band, the Carolina Chocolate Drops, along with such artists
as The Ebony Hillbillies, represent a new growth of African
American folk music, and will likely continue to write
racially themed songs as long as the legacy of slavery
continues to hinder American progress. 67
Another emancipationist song is Mandolin Orange’s
“Wildfire” from 2016. The lyrics are explicit in their singling
out of slavery as the cause of the Civil War, recounting that
“too much money rolled in to ever end slavery / The cry for
Frank Carlson and Mike Fritz, “Rhiannon Giddens performs ‘Julie,’ a
song inspired by a slave’s story,” PBS NewsHour, April 15, 2015.
65
Rhiannon Giddens, “Julie,” track 3 on Freedom Highway, Nonesuch
558805-1, 2017, CD.
66
Rhiannon Giddens, “At the Purchaser’s Option,” track 1 on Freedom
Highway.
67
Chris LH Durman, “African American Old-Time String Band Music:
A Selective Discography,” Notes 64, no. 4 (2008): 808.
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war spread like wildfire.” The song continues with an attack
on Southern racism, especially after Reconstruction: “The
South was spent / But its true demise was hatred passed
down through the years / It should have been different / […]
But pride has a way of holding too firm to history / And it
burns like wildfire.” 68 Songs by Giddens, Mandolin Orange
(now Watchhouse), and The SteelDrivers represent a
departure from the reconciliationist messages of the past in
their candid focus on slavery and the lives of enslaved
people.
Finally, a song fitting better in the neo-folk tradition
but still of interest here is “Ballad of the 20th Maine” by The
Ghost of Paul Revere, released in 2015. The song recounts
the story of Andrew J. Tozier, a real-life solder in the 20th
Maine, and his division’s near defeat at the Battle of
Gettysburg. It carries a distinctly pro-Union sentiment, with
lyrics such as, “We were steadfast as [Mount] Katahdin, hard
as winter’s rain / Take that rebel yell with you to hell / We
are the 20th Maine.” 69 The Ghost of Paul Revere represents
a unique Northern perspective in bluegrass, reflecting the
genre’s growing popularity outside the South. As bluegrass
continues to find new audiences, more Civil War songs with
a Unionist point of view are likely to emerge.
As the above examples demonstrate, modern
bluegrass has taken up a more balanced approach to the Civil
War, incorporating African American and Unionist
Mandolin Orange, “Wildfire,” track 2 on Blindfaller, Yep Roc Records
YEP-2487, 2016, CD.
69
The Ghost of Paul Revere, “Ballad of the 20th Maine,” track 2 on Field
Notes Vol. 1, self-released, 2015, CD.
68
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perspectives, and finally corrected the reconciliationist view
with the emergence of emancipationist music. Though Civil
War themes in bluegrass were at a historic low by the 1980s,
they have resurfaced in recent years due to heightened
tensions over the war and its ongoing legacy. Moreover, the
Lost Cause rhetoric so common in the early 1970s has
largely faded from public performances and, while still
extant in some corners, remains increasingly unpopular. The
Civil War will undoubtedly continue to appear in bluegrass
music due to the nature of the genre and how well the war
fits within its traditional themes, but the rate and nature of
these appearances will largely depend upon race relations
and how the American society will continue to view the
Confederacy and the Civil War as a whole.
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“GOOD NEIGHBOURHOOD”:
CANADA AND AMERICA’S CONTENTIOUS
RELATIONSHIP DURING THE CIVIL WAR
Michael R. D. Connolly | University of Ottawa
On May 30, 1867, Jefferson Davis, former president of the
Confederate States of America, arrived in Toronto following
his imprisonment after the Civil War. “I thank you for the
honour you have shown me,” he exclaimed to the crowd that
had gathered to welcome him for his five-month visit; “May
peace and prosperity be forever the blessing of Canada, for
she has been the asylum of many of my friends, as she is now
an asylum for myself… May God bless you all.” 1
During the Civil War, Canada became a safe haven
for Americans on either side of the Mason-Dixon line. Draftdodgers, refugees, traitors, diplomats, and agitators all made
the Province their home for a multitude of reasons. Yet while
both Northern and Southern agents spent their efforts spying
on each other and reporting intelligence back to their
respective capitals, the Confederacy accomplished far more
in Canada than the Union. In 1864, after years of courting
politicians in Great Britain as well as Canada, Confederates
decided to push their luck from across the northern border.
Their planning culminated in two attacks executed from
Canada: The seizure of the Philo Parsons on Lake Erie on
September 19, 1864, and the raid on St. Albans, Vermont in
Adam Mayers, Dixie & the Dominion: Canada, the Confederacy, and
the War for the Union (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2003), 20.
1
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the following month. These attacks forced Great Britain to
reassess its neutrality and Canada to adopt more stringent
neutrality laws under pressure from the Union. They
damaged the Confederacy’s image in turn among Canadians
who had previously been hospitable to Southern partisans,
with figures such as Clement Vallandigham—an anti-war
Democrat exiled from the North and then deported from the
South—earlier finding refuge in Ontario. But the impact of
the raids was far from universal, and many Canadians
continued to hope for a Confederate victory well into the
final year of the war. This article examines how and why so
many Southerners, all the way up to Jefferson Davis, found
their way in Canada during the and after the American Civil
War.
Canadian Considerations
The Civil War coincided with a growing sense of Canadian
national identity. 2 Accordingly, attitudes toward the war
centred around three primary issues: The prospect of a
stronger Canada when faced with a divided America; the
morality of slavery; and republicanism as an alternative
political structure. As historian Sydney F. Wise put it, most
In 1841, British possessions in North America were merged into the
Province of Canada, consisting of Canada West (also known as Upper
Canada, or Ontario) and Canada East (also known as Lower Canada, or
Quebec). Due in part to the conditions created by the American Civil
War, the 1860s saw increased calls for the United Canadas to join with
other British colonies in a single Canadian Confederation, governed by
one Parliament and colonial administration. The Province merged with
Nova Scotia and New Brunswick into the Dominion of Canada on July
1, 1867, laying the foundations for the modern Canadian state.
2
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Canadians were not “pro-North” or “pro-South,” but rather
“anti-North” or “anti-South.” 3 From the American Revolution onward, the United States posed a constant threat to
Canada, its territory, and its parliamentary democracy. This
was a fact widely recognized by colonists and Britons alike.
For many Canadians, it was clear that a strong Union was
more likely to attack its northern neighbour than a divided
one. Moreover, the British government believed that by
inclining its sympathies toward the South—through the
buying and selling of contraband, the harbouring of
fugitives, and diplomatic recognition of the Confederacy—
it might be able to prevent Canada from falling victim to the
doctrine of Manifest Destiny. 4
Given these considerations, Canadian politicians
greeted the outbreak of war with some enthusiasm. In 1861,
Joint Premier of the Province of Canada John A. Macdonald 5
expressed his belief that the South would gain independence
from the United States: “If they [Americans] are to be
Sydney F. Wise, God’s Peculiar Peoples: Essays on Political Culture
in Nineteenth Century Canada (Ottawa: Carleton University Press,
1993), 138.
4
George Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations
since 1776, vol. 1, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017),
217-21.
5
From its formation in 1841, the Province of Canada was governed by a
Parliament with equal representation from Canada West and Canada
East; this is the legislature referenced throughout this paper. Each
region’s delegation was headed by a Premier, with the two men working
in tandem as joint heads of government. John A. Macdonald served as
Joint Premier from Canada West from 1856 to 1862 and again from 1864
to 1867. Upon Confederation, the Provincial legislature was replaced
with the modern-day Parliament and Macdonald became Canada’s first
prime minister.
3

41

Connolly
severed in two, as severed I believe they will be, they will be
two great, two noble, two free nations [that] will exist in the
place of one.” 6 Thomas D’Arcy McGee, Macdonald’s ally
in Parliament and a fellow Conservative, voiced much the
same sentiment in an 1863 letter to the Toronto Globe: “If
stability be essential to good government, [the United States]
have not had stability, and therefore, their description of
government cannot be good either for themselves or for
others.” 7
In Macdonald and McGee’s view, the United States
was doomed because it had failed to create a stable
government like that of Great Britain. American institutions,
from Congress to the presidency, lent inherent instability to
the state. Further, by changing its head of state so frequently
(prior to the Civil War, the United States had not had a twoterm president since Andrew Jackson three decades earlier),
the US government was unable to settle its affairs before
another president from another party could take power with
a new set of policies, patrons, and cabinet appointments.
With a change in administration every four years from 1837
to 1861, it is easy to understand why Macdonald and McGee
thought the United States was not built for longevity. For
these men, the Civil War was but the natural outgrowth of
republican democracy.
George Brown, an adversary of Macdonald’s in the
liberal Reform movement and founding editor of The Globe,
Richard J. Gwyn, John A: The Man Who Made Us (Toronto: Random
House Canada, 2007), 245.
7
Thomas D’Arcy McGee, “Letter From the Hon. Mr. McGee: A Fair
Trial for the Monarchical Principle,” The Globe (Toronto), July 6, 1863.
6
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was of a similar mind. In an article from 1849, Brown
attacked the United States for its preservation of slavery and
Canadian annexationists for their desire to join the failing
republic: “We turn… to this side of the Atlantic and ask what
has the great and swelling Republic of the United States done
for Freedom? We answer—nothing. We say it has gone back
since it started into existence from its connexion with
England.” 8 An ardent abolitionist, Brown believed that
America’s failure stemmed not from its republican
institutions per se, but because it had failed to end slavery
like Great Britain had done in the early nineteenth century.
He was Garrisonian in his condemnation:
It is difficult to believe that the Government will be
perpetually on the side of freedom, when the very
preservation of that unholy bond, the Union, is based
on the principle that in vast tracts of their country the
human mind is placed under Russian restraint, that it
is death in some places to teach children to read if
they have a drop of coloured blood in their veins; that
for a man to speak of freedom is imprisonment or
possibly death from a lawless mob… They have
maintained their own rights as the Emperors of
Russia and Austria maintain theirs, but they have as
little regard for liberty or the rights of others as these
tyrants have. 9
George Brown, “What Has Republicanism Done for Freedom?” The
Globe (Toronto), December 6, 1849.
9
Brown, “What Has Republicanism Done for Freedom?”
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Brown detested America for its hypocrisy. The United States
styled itself as the land of liberty, yet continued to preserve
slavery and even expand it throughout the continent. It laid
claim to liberalism, and while it had a democracy in name,
its ruling elite harboured similar attitudes toward the lower
classes as European autocrats.
Brown’s hatred of slavery inclined him to support the
Union when the war broke out, but he remained distrustful
of the North’s republican tradition. Macdonald and McGee,
for their part, were far more concerned for Canada and its
future than the liberty of American slaves. In July 1861,
Conservatives in Parliament cheered the Confederate victory
at the First Battle of Bull Run until they were angrily
silenced by Macdonald, as he understood the British
government’s need for strict neutrality. 10 Yet sympathies for
the South did not break along party lines; there were also a
number of Liberals who expressed support for the
Confederacy. Malcolm Colin Cameron, a Liberal politician
from Ontario, stated in 1865 that “he had no hesitation in
declaring that his feeling and sympathy were more aroused
by the manly and brave fight the people of the Southern
States were making for their independence, than by the
attempts of the North to put them down.” This remark came
while debating an immigration bill before Parliament.
Brown responded by contrasting Cameron’s love of British

10
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freedom and his “sympathy with those who were fighting to
keep 4,000,000 slaves in bondage.” 11
In short, Canadian feelings toward the Civil War
were consistently mixed. As they argued over what shape
their own country would take throughout the 1860s, many
Canadians held an independent South to be in the national
interest. A successful rebellion would prove the United
States a failed experiment, demonstrating the rightfulness of
Canada’s place in the British Empire to annexationists. For
others, such as George Brown, a Confederate victory would
spell doom for the millions of enslaved people south of the
Mason-Dixon. While supportive of the Union effort, it is
important to remember that Canadian abolitionists were
often as hostile to republicanism as their pro-Southern
counterparts. Following in the longer tradition of British
abolitionism, they forcefully opposed slavery without
questioning Canada’s broader political constitution.
Rebels in the Great White North
Divided attitudes toward the war did not prevent Canada
from sheltering one of the Union’s best-known Southern
partisans. Congressman Clement Vallandigham was a
notorious Peace Democrat who, having lost his re-election
to the House after Republicans in the Ohio state legislature
gerrymandered his district, was arrested for delivering an
anti-Lincoln speech and exiled to the Confederacy in the
“Our Relations with Canada: Interesting Debate in the Provincial
Parliament. The Alien Bill upon its Second Reading,” The New York
Times, February 3, 1865.
11
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summer of 1863. 12 However, he was equally unwanted in the
South. Diarist Mary Boykin Chesnut thought Vallandigham
useless to the Southern cause, writing on July 8, 1863 that “I
am sure we could not trust him to do us any good, or to do
the Yankees any harm. The Coriolanus business is played
out.” 13 Referencing Shakespeare’s tragedy, Chesnut
believed Vallandigham had outlived his usefulness the
moment he lost his seat in Congress.
Realizing the dearth of political prospects in the
South, and sure that he would be killed if he returned to the
Union, Vallandigham was more than happy when Jefferson
Davis “ordered the Confederacy’s problematic guest to be
escorted to Wilmington, North Carolina, where he could
board a blockade runner bound for neutral British
territory.” 14 According to historian Robin Winks, Vallandigham was “fêted” at a “public dinner in Montreal” upon
arrival in Canada in July 1863. He was visited by a number
of elite Canadians, including William Walker, manager of
the Grand Trunk Railway, as well as Governor Alexander
Dallas of Rupert’s Land and Premier Macdonald himself.
Vallandigham was even introduced on the floor of the
Parliament by Thomas D’Arcy McGee. 15 Given the
Southern sympathies of many in government (see above),
Fergus M. Bordewich, Congress at War: How Republican Reformers
Fought the Civil War, Defied Lincoln, Ended Slavery, and Remade
America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2020), 173.
13
Mary Boykin Chesnut, A Diary from Dixie (New York: D. Appleton
& Company, 1905), 216.
14
Bordewich, Congress at War, 231.
15
Robin Winks, Canada and the United States: The Civil War Years
(Montreal: Harvest House, 1971), 143.
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Canadian Tories were more than willing to accommodate
their Copperhead visitor. While he had been worthless to the
Confederacy while in exile there, from Canada Vallandigham was able to forward his political agenda and launch
a bid for governor of Ohio.
Once settled, Vallandigham ran his gubernatorial
campaign from Windsor, Ontario, just across the river from
Detroit. He was assisted by Jacob Thompson, former United
States Secretary of the Interior and Inspector General of the
Confederate States Army, who was sent to Canada as a
leader of the Confederate Secret Service. Thompson offered
logistical support from the Confederate government. In turn,
Vallandigham offered information regarding public opinion
toward the war in the Union, however skewed his own
perspective may have been. Thompson even offered money
and arms to spark a Copperhead uprising in the Midwest 16
after Vallandigham insisted that a “feeling of fatigue and
rising anger had been building in the North following the
staggering casualties at Gettysburg.” He believed that with
only a slight push, “an uprising in the Midwest would create
a second confederacy and end the war.” 17 None of this was
true. But whether he had received inaccurate information or
had simply misread the results of the 1862-63 midterm
elections, Vallandigham, in a direct attack on British
neutrality, was working to incite violence in the United
States.
Cathryn J. Prince, Burn the Town and Sack the Banks: Confederates
Attack Vermont! (New York: Carroll & Graf, 2006), 116.
17
Mayers, Dixie & the Dominion, 28.
16
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Both Canadian and American authorities, well aware
of the comings and goings of Confederate agents in Canada,
kept a close eye on Vallandigham. Rumours circulated
throughout the Union that Vallandigham was “conniving”
with Canadians and Confederates “to let an armed steamer
pass through the Welland Canal” into New York; the
Rochester Evening Express further suggested that a
“Canadian Gunboat” was “on the way to burn Sandusky
[Ohio],” a city on the shores of Lake Erie. 18 Though false,
these rumours damaged Canada’s credibility in the eyes of
many Northerners. The fact that Canada was known to
harbour Southern fugitives and agents—and especially that
it hosted the likes of Vallandigham in a town where he could
see Detroit from his bedroom window—did not endear
Northerners to their foreign neighbours.
The Union’s fears were almost realized from across
the northern border on September 19, 1864. That night, a
Virginian named John Yates Beall, Captain Charles H. Cole
of the Confederate Army, and a group of around thirty
Southern sympathizers attempted to free the Confederate
soldiers held on Johnson’s Island, which housed a prison
camp three miles off Sandusky Bay, Ohio. Organized in
Canada, the plan was fairly straightforward. Cole was to
prevail upon the captain of the USS Michigan, an ironclad
warship stationed in Sandusky, to drug and subdue the ship’s
crew. Then Beall and his company would steal a ferry (the
steamship Philo Parsons), regroup with Cole, overtake the
Michigan, turn its guns on Johnson’s Island, and liberate the
18

Winks, Canada and the United States, 148.
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camp’s 2,500 Confederate prisoners. Finally, they would
organize the soldiers into a small army and ravage the
Midwest, 19 although how exactly the conspirators intended
to lead thousands of “sick, injured, and malnourished
officers” was never fully explained. 20 But the raid did not go
as planned, as the captain and crew of the Michigan caught
on to Cole’s act fairly quickly. By the time Beall and his
compatriots had arrived at Sandusky on the Philo Parsons,
it was clear that Cole had not fulfilled his part of the mission.
The crew returned to Windsor and scuttled the ferry. In their
haste, however, Beall had broken British neutrality law by
stealing baggage and arms from the Philo Parsons’
passengers, as well as the ship’s piano and one hundred
dollars belonging to the ship’s captain. Because the
conspirators had robbed the ship and violated Britain’s
neutrality, Canada was able to extradite them to the United
States on charges of robbery. 21
The Canadian press was outraged by the attack. Even
traditionally pro-Southern newspapers such as the Toronto
Leader believed that the raiders had “abused Canadian
hospitality” in their commandeering of the Philo Parsons. 22
The colonial government was equally incensed. Governor
General Charles Monck, who had urged Parliament to
increase firepower on the Great Lakes earlier in the war,
feared what the plot might spell for British neutrality. 23
Mayers, Dixie & the Dominion, 28.
Winks, Canada and the United States, 288.
21
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22
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23
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Monck wanted to ensure Canada’s ability to thwart any
future Southern incursions, requesting greater legal authority
from Westminster to “seize vessels and munitions on the
lakes, including the incendiary materials used by the rebels
to fire on American cities.” He also sought the authority to
expel anyone suspected of violating British neutrality, or at
least to imprison them, in his language, on charges of
“levying war from Her Majesty’s Dominions against a
friendly power.” 24
Monck knew that there was a greater problem at
hand: that his government had been unable to track the
actions of Southern agents in Canada. He was aware that
spies and agitators were operating in the country, but had
been promised by agent James Holcombe in May 1864 that
the Confederacy “did not plan any hostile acts from
Canadian soil,” and that its actors “would not violate any
local or Imperial laws.” 25 By September of the same year, it
was obvious that Monck could not trust what Confederate
agents had told him.
At the same time as the Philo Parsons incident, the
Confederacy was steadily losing control of its own territory.
Generals Ulysses S. Grant and William Tecumseh Sherman
had already pushed deep into the heart of the South (Union
forces entered Atlanta just two weeks before the Sandusky
raid), and the upcoming presidential election in November
meant that Confederates needed to do whatever they could
to terrorize pro-Union voters and embolden Copperhead
24
25
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Democrats. While sliding autumn temperatures made
another naval attack from Canada unlikely, the Union was
forced to temporarily withdraw from the Rush-Bagot
Treaty—a naval disarmament pact between the United
States and Britain signed after the War of 1812—and
reinforce the Great Lakes out of precaution. 26 As the Union
believed Great Britain to be failing its promise of neutrality
and knew that many powerful Canadians harboured
Southern sympathies out of self-interest, this move only
worked to heighten diplomatic tensions.
Northerners were still reeling from the raid on Lake
Erie when they learned of a second incursion from across the
border. This time, however, the consequences would be far
greater. The raid on St. Albans, Vermont occurred on
October 19, 1864, exactly one month after the Philo Parsons
incident and the same day as a decisive Union victory at the
Battle of Cedar Creek. In the days leading up to the attack,
Southern agents arrived in the small trading town just south
of the border with Quebec. Posing as Canadians in a hunting
club, 27 the men went practically unnoticed by the locals, who
“never paid much heed to the comings and goings of
strangers,” as they were accustomed to traders and travelers
frequenting their town. 28 At three o’clock in the afternoon
on October 19, a twenty-one-year-old Kentuckian named
Bennett Young, who had previously served with the expert
Confederate raider John Hunt Morgan, 29 stepped out onto
Winks, Canada and the United States, 293.
Winks, Canada and the United States, 298.
28
Prince, Burn the Town and Sack the Banks, 126.
29
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26
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his hotel’s front porch, waved his Navy Colt revolver in the
air and loudly proclaimed: “In the name of the Confederate
States, I take possession of St. Albans!” 30
Young and his band proceeded to sack the three
banks of St. Albans, stealing horses and weapons in the name
of the Confederacy. Aware of the problems that had hindered
the Philo Parson affair, Robin Winks writes that Young “had
instructed his men clearly to stamp the raid as an act of war,
but despite his own announcement from the hotel porch, his
followers left themselves open to serious charges by the way
in which they identified themselves.” 31 The raid itself lasted
only a few hours but left a devastating psychological impact
on the inhabitants of St. Albans. The goal was not to rape
and pillage, but to strike fear into the hearts of Northerners
and give them a taste of what Southerners were feeling at the
same time. As one of the raiders put it:
I wish to say that killing women and children was the
last thing thought of. We wanted to let the North
understand that there were two sides to this war, and
that they can’t be rolling in wealth and comfort,
while we in the South are bearing all the hardships
and privations. In retaliation for [General Philip H.]
Sheridan’s atrocities in the Shenandoah Valley, we
desired to destroy property, not the lives of women

30
31
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and children, although that would, of course, have
followed in its train. 32
Today these actions would be labeled as terrorism, but in the
context of nineteenth-century warfare, they were understood
as revenge. The raiders were keenly aware that if Southern
attacks in other areas were as successful as they had been in
Vermont, if the Philo Parsons plot had gone off as planned,
if Confederates had a proper army to invade the Union from
Canada, then they could copy the scorched-earth tactics that
Northern forces were using in their homelands.
At the raid’s conclusion, the agents rushed back
across the Canadian border, followed by a posse of
townspeople from St. Albans. Though they failed to capture
most of the attackers, the pursuers did get a hold of Young
after crossing into Quebec. But the St. Albans men, with
Young in tow, were stopped by a British officer, who
informed them that they were in violation of Canadian
neutrality. The soldier then took Young to join the other
raiders, who had already been apprehended by British
forces. 33
Canadians were swift to condemn the raid. An article
in The Globe, printed two days after the attack, protested that
“Our country affords an asylum for thousands of Southern
refugees, and it would be most infamous for the Confederate
government to send men here commissioned to plunder our
neighbours with whom we are at peace.” The author also
32
33
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hoped that “the Confederate robbers were acting upon their
own responsibility” rather than on orders from the
government. 34 Canadians had every reason to be outraged:
they had opened their doors to Southerners who, in turn,
stabbed them in the back whenever it became convenient.
The Confederates were also in a difficult position. By
October 1864, with William Tecumseh Sherman fighting
through Georgia and Philip Sheridan’s Valley campaign
brought to a successful conclusion in Virginia, the tide had
shifted in the Union’s favour. It was clear that the
Confederacy would need to turn to increasingly drastic
actions, even if it meant provoking a friendly nation like
Great Britain.
Yet no nation was so provoked as the Union.
Secretary of State William Seward believed that Canadians
“were not displaying ‘good neighbourhood’ in permitting
such raids to be planned in their midst.” 35 For Seward,
Canada was responsible for the Confederate agents in its
territory, whose conduct “might endanger peace with
Canada.” Seward’s feelings were not helped by the fact that,
during his trial, Bennett Young claimed that he was sent to
Canada “as a commissioned officer in the provisional army
of the Confederate States and that he had violated no law of
Canada.” 36 Young contended that the raid was not planned
in Canada and therefore did not violate British neutrality. 37
“The St. Albans Raid,” The Globe, October 22, 1864.
Winks, Canada and the United States, 303.
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But the Union took the matter seriously, and was compelled
to take diplomatic action in response.
Wars and Rumours of Wars
In his annual address to Congress on December 6, 1864,
President Abraham Lincoln discussed the situation with
Canada. He brought forward his recommendations for
retaliatory action against the Province:
In view of the insecurity of life and property in the
region adjacent to the Canadian border, by reason of
recent assaults and depredations committed by
inimical and desperate persons who are harbored
there, it has been thought proper to give notice that
after the expiration of six months… the United States
must hold themselves at liberty to increase their
naval armaments upon the lakes… The condition of
the border will necessarily come into consideration
in connection with the questions of continuing or
modifying the rights of transit from Canada through
the United States, as well as the regulation of
imposts, which were temporarily established by the
Reciprocity Treaty of the 5th of June, 1854. 38
The Reciprocity Treaty had eliminated customs tariffs
between the United States and Canada, creating an economic
Abraham Lincoln, “Annual Message to Congress,” in The Civil War:
The Final Year Told by Those Who Lived It, ed. Aaron Sheehan-Dean
(New York: Library of America, 2014), 497.
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boom north of the border. The prospect of its revocation
would deprive Canada of one of its most lucrative trading
markets and force it to rely more heavily on Great Britain for
imports.
Lincoln maintained that “the colonial authorities of
Canada are not deemed to be intentionally unjust or
unfriendly towards the United States… there is every reason
to expect that… they will take the necessary measures to
prevent new incursions across the border.” 39 He was not
looking to attack Canada, but to prod Canadians into doing
what he wanted of them: stop Confederate agents from
working in the country and draft stronger neutrality
legislation. He was also aware of the economic damage he
could inflict to leverage his hand. An article from the New
York Albion on December 17 questioned Lincoln’s ability to
abrogate the Reciprocity Treaty and criticized his
administration for failing to protect the Union: “The
termination of the Reciprocity Treaty appears likely to pass
both Houses [of Congress] at a gallop. Yet it is by no means
certain that the Executive will be in a hurry to act in this
manner… it does not desire to quarrel with the North West,
whose interests lie [in the continuance of the Treaty].” 40 In
other words, Lincoln needed to pay heed to the Old
Northwest (known today as the Upper Midwest), where
many Copperheads remained influential and where the
Reciprocity Treaty was seen as an economic benefit. Yet in
Lincoln, “Annual Message to Congress,” 497.
“The St. Albans’ Raiders: A Canadian Difficulty,” The Albion: A
Journal of News, Politics and Literature (New York), December 17,
1864.
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the time between Lincoln’s address to Congress on
December 6 and the Albion article from December 17, the
judge presiding over the St. Albans case in Canada had
handed down a ruling that further enraged the Northern
public.
On December 13, 1864, after more than a month of
hearings, Judge Charles-Joseph Coursol ruled that he lacked
a warrant from the Governor General and that no machinery
for extradition existed under the Webster-Ashburton Treaty
of 1842. 41 “Consequently,” he said, “I am bound in law,
justice and fairness to order the immediate release of the
prisoners upon all charges brought before me. Let the
prisoners be discharged.” 42 Needless to say, this was a result
that neither Canada nor the Union was hoping for. On
December 14, the United States Senate passed two
resolutions condemning the ruling, and on the same day
Governor General Monck stated that the ruling was absurd
and ordered that the raiders be re-arrested. 43 He also urged
the government to investigate Coursol for any possible
misconduct. 44 Further, on December 17, the US State
Department issued the passport controls that Lincoln had
threatened in his message to Congress, bringing cross-border
traffic to a halt. 45 In the span of just four months, Southern
agents in Canada had gone from refugees to unwelcome
guests, and Anglo-American relations from strained to
Winks, Canada and the United States, 313.
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43
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nearly broken. The raiders were indeed re-arrested following
Monck’s order and put on trial with a different judge, but the
damage was already done.
From late December 1864 to April 1865, the threat
of war loomed over Canada and Great Britain like the sword
of Damocles. One newspaper referred to the threat of
invasion as “a war in anticipation” with the Union. 46 As the
United States maintained a strong professional army that had
been fighting for over four years, it was doubtful that Canada
would remain in British hands were war to break out. For
Confederates, a war between Britain and the Union would
be a best-case scenario, as they believed the North would be
unable to fight a two-front war. A clerk in the Confederate
War Department wrote that “A war with England would be
our peace,” and the diarist George Templeton Strong
believed that a military reaction to Coursol’s ruling “would
be an inducement for Confederates to repeat the [St. Albans]
raid” to push the North into war. 47 Canadian and British
media began to turn even more strongly against the South.
The Telegraph from Saint John, New Brunswick claimed
that “the Confederacy was abusing provincial hospitality in
order to embroil Great Britain in war with the United
States.” 48 The Globe insisted in March 1865 that “There
could be but one object in these acts—if at all acts of war—
and that would be to occasion war between England and the
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United States, as such alone could aid their [Confederate]
cause.” 49
Even as General Grant neared Richmond, the
Confederacy had a newfound confidence on the world stage.
The St. Albans raid had worked spectacularly to incite the
Union’s anger against its colonial neighbour, and Canada’s
neutrality laws had given Southern agents a chance at
freedom. Yet as Robin Winks has written, “Any satisfaction
gained in the South by the daring that the raiders displayed
was more than offset by the feeling created in the Canadas
that the Confederacy had abused British hospitality… Even
papers that had been highly sympathetic to the South, like
the Montreal Evening Telegram and the Toronto Leader,
deplored the acts of ‘the brigands.’” 50
The raids destroyed any remaining credibility the
Confederacy may have had in Canada as the fear of war and
annexation by the United States increased. Addressing
Parliament in February 1865, John A. Macdonald decried
“those who had come to make use of our country as the base
of operations against the United States, and to induce if
possible a war between Great Britain and the United
States.” 51 Despite his well-known Southern sympathies,
Macdonald was forced to move against the Confederacy to
preserve peace with the Union. Even Lord Palmerston,
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, acknowledged that
the North should be allowed to voice its displeasure. In order
“Latest from Montreal: The St. Albans Raid Case. Mr. Devlin’s
Argument,” The Globe (Toronto), March 22, 1865.
50
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to avoid “an angry debate” between the two nations,
Palmerston recognized that “things did take place of which
the United States were justly entitled to complain.” 52 To
pacify the Union, both Canada and Britain needed to ensure
that another St. Albans would never happen again—and if it
did, that its perpetrators could be extradited. In short, they
needed to adopt more stringent neutrality laws.
Though it remained officially neutral throughout, the
British government’s attitude toward the war had ebbed and
flowed with the tide of Southern military fortunes. By 1865
it was confident of a Union victory—and while there were
“many well-wishers both to the North and South” in Britain,
popular opinion as the war neared its end was summed up in
The Times of London: The Union and Confederacy “entered
into this ill-advised quarrel without consulting us; we wish
that they would put an end to it under the same conditions.” 53
This article was reprinted in the Toronto Globe, indicating
that it spoke for many Canadians as well. Britons had simply
grown tired of the war; they had lent assistance to the South
when it suited them, but now were ready for the drama to be
over with. War weariness was a sentiment understandably
shared by the Northern public as well.
In February 1865, Canada’s Parliament finally
passed a revised neutrality law in the hopes of preventing an
Anglo-American conflict. The bill, dubbed the Alien Act,
had three primary components. First, it enabled the Canadian
Callahan, The Diplomatic History of the Southern Confederacy, 237.
“British Neutrality to be Maintained,” The Globe (Toronto), January
31, 1865.
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government “to remove from this country aliens who are
coming here and seeking an asylum in consequence of war,
who may have in their own land by their conduct, proved
themselves unworthy of that asylum.” It then cited the
Neutrality Act, first ratified by the United States Congress in
1794 and updated in 1838, as an example of American
legislation “prevent[ing] incursions into Canada.” Finally,
the bill expressed its “purpose of requiring persons
manufacturing arms and munitions of war, which might be
suspected to be intended to be used in hostilities against the
United States, to give an account of them.” 54 The chief goal
of the Alien Act was to lessen friction with the United States,
and in that it can be counted as a success. Its invocation of
the Neutrality Act as a reminder of friendly relations in the
past had even come at the suggestion of Secretary Seward. 55
The Conservative government, however, was not so
willing to acknowledge American pressure. In Parliament
Macdonald asserted that the act “had been initiated entirely
at the suggestion of the Canadian Government, and not from
any declaration, suggestion, and so much as expression of
desire on the part of the United States Government to have
such legislation.” George Brown repeated the claim on the
floor of Parliament, adding that “he supported the bill, not as
a partisan of North or South, but as a citizen of Canada,
anxious to preserve the peace of the country, and prevent war
between Great Britain and the United States.” 56 But it was
“Our Relations with Canada.”
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obvious that the Alien Act had indeed been drafted at the
North’s insistence. As a matter of course, it also enumerated
the extradition powers that Governor General Monck had
earlier requested from London. 57 Although these powers
came too late for Monck, they were part of Canada and
Britain’s efforts to maintain good relations with the United
States no matter the outcome of the Civil War. Most
pointedly, the act denied Confederates the ability to wage
their guerilla war from across the Canadian border. Yet by
the time it passed through Parliament, Sherman’s March to
the Sea had moved into the Carolinas and the Siege of
Petersburg was well underway. The South had already lost.
Ottawa and Appomattox
Unfortunately for Canada, the Union was not as forgiving as
it would have liked. Despite Parliament’s appeals to the
Northern government, the United States was unwilling to
renew the Reciprocity Treaty. In a letter to British politician
John Bright written less than a month before Lee’s surrender,
Senator Charles Sumner (R-MA) stated the following:
I came into the proposition to give the notice to
terminate the Reciprocity Treaty, because I was
satisfied that we could not negotiate for its modification, on a footing of equality unless our hands were
untied… Congress has separated in good humor,
without anxiety for the future, & indeed confident
that we are on the verge of peace. My desire is that
57
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England should do something to take out the bitterness from the American heart—before the war
closes. 58
Sumner was not opposed to continuing the Reciprocity
Treaty, but the Philo Parsons incident, the attack on St.
Albans, and the harbouring of Southern refugees did not
endear the senator to Canada. While he lacked an appetite
for armed confrontation after years of bloodshed, he wanted
more than the steps already taken in the Alien Act.
Canada did attempt to “take out the bitterness from
the American heart.” The Montreal Telegraph Company
offered to work with the Union by diverting Confederate
messages to Washington, but the State Department refused;
according to Seward, the offer was “incompatible with the
self respect of the U.S.” 59 The Canadian government also
proposed financial restitution for the raid on St. Albans. This
effort was more successful than initiatives from the private
sector. In April 1865, the government paid a sum of $60,000
to the three banks of St. Albans in compensation for the
money stolen during the attack. 60 Thus the crisis in
Canadian-American relations was brought to a close at the
same time as the Civil War—even though the Confederacy
bore most of the responsibility for the diplomatic nadir.
Canada had demonstrated its willingness to meet
American demands in the form of neutrality legislation,
Charles Sumner, “Charles Sumner to John Bright,” in The Civil War,
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59
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intelligence exchange, and cash. Yet the United States never
reinstated the Reciprocity Treaty, which had done so much
to grow Canada’s economy during its short lifespan. Indeed,
the Civil War would impact Anglo- and Canadian-American
relations for decades to come. Canada’s initial sympathies
toward the South provided Confederates with a base for
intelligence operations and guerilla warfare. Moreover, its
willingness to accommodate other Southern sympathizers
like Clement Vallandigham damaged Canada’s relationship
with the Union, and allowed Confederate agents to feel
welcome enough to abuse British hospitality for their own
benefit. The Philo Parsons affair and the St. Albans raid
showed Canadians that many of their Southern guests were
not mere refugees, but hostile actors conspiring against their
closest neighbour. Canada’s deficient neutrality laws pushed
Great Britain and the Union closer to war, which would have
been of significant benefit to the Confederacy. All of this led
to a weakened Canadian economy and restrictions on the
free movement of people and goods between Canada and the
United States both during and after the Civil War. These
conditions led in no small part to Canadian Confederation in
1867 and the foundation of the modern Canadian state.
Canadians were charmed by Confederates. Their
charisma and aristocratic ways were similar to those of the
English. Anti-Americanism further allowed Canadians to be
fooled into a tacit support for Southern agents within their
borders, hoping that a fractured Union would lead to a
stronger British Empire. What resulted was a plate full of
crow for Canada.
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Heaven Hung in Black
HEAVEN HUNG IN BLACK:
GRANT’S REPUTATION AND THE MISTAKES AT
COLD HARBOR
Samantha Kramer | Washington & Jefferson College
When Ulysses S. Grant received his commission as
Lieutenant-General on March 9, 1864, not only did he gain
control over the entire Union Army, but was also subjected
to mounting pressure from the White House to end the war
as quickly as possible. It was an election year, and if Lincoln
wanted any chance of winning re-nomination from his party,
decisive victories on the battlefield were needed. With antiwar sentiment growing in the North, it was necessary to
demonstrate that the war was at its end and that the
Confederacy was on the brink of destruction. This would
prove easier said than done; it took massive coordination to
move the army in unison, the destruction of Georgia under
Sherman, a long siege that left Richmond struggling to
survive, and some of the bloodiest warfare yet to finally
force Lee’s surrender at Appomattox in April 1865.
It was the beginning of this grand offensive that
caused contemporaries as well as historians to label Grant a
butcher of his own men. Weeks of fighting during the
Overland Campaign culminated in the disastrous assault on
Cold Harbor, which left nearly five Union soldiers for every
Confederate. Cold Harbor was undoubtedly Grant’s worst
defeat, but to pretend that the casualties were his intention or
that he was indifferent to how many men he lost so long as
he gained something in the end is unjust. To do so would
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ignore the various factors leading to the battle, reducing a
grand strategy to bloodlust over errors made by multiple
parties. Grant did not set out to butcher his men, but in his
desperation to end the war as soon as possible, his mistakes
led to the deaths of the very men he was trying to save.
The Grand Offensive
When Grant stepped in as commander of the Union forces,
he gained an army with a struggling chain of command, little
coordination between the various divisions spread around
the country, and an Eastern Theater with terrain that made
any sort of troop movement a difficult and time-consuming
affair. After his decisive victories in the Western Theater,
Grant realized that if the army moved along three fronts at
once, relentlessly pushing forward and keeping Lee’s forces
on the defensive, the Union could act as a noose locking the
remaining Confederate Army in place and slowly strangling
it into submission. By 1864, the goal was no longer to settle
the war through large victories and force the Confederacy to
surrender, but the complete destruction and capture of Lee’s
forces. Grant had seen too many battles in which
commanders failed to give chase immediately after a victory,
allowing Confederates to reorganize, lick their wounds, and
settle into strong defensive positions that would push back
the Union soldiers eventually sent after them. He was
determined not to repeat these mistakes, preferring
aggressive, continual assaults.
Equally central to Grant’s strategy were flanking
maneuvers designed to cut off communications and destroy
supply lines. Virginia’s food supplies were exhausted at this
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point in the war, forcing it to rely on supplies from Alabama,
Georgia, and the Carolinas. 1 As part of his offensive,
Sherman and his men would advance from their position in
Chattanooga and eliminate Albert Sidney Johnston’s army
near Dalton, Georgia before pressing forward to occupy
Atlanta. 2 By capturing Atlanta and moving north through the
Carolinas, Sherman would destroy the supplies necessary to
sustain the Confederate war effort. He would also prevent
Lee’s army from fleeing further south to avoid the Army of
the Potomac under Grant and George Meade, thus trapping
them in place.
However, Grant was limited in how he could execute
the northern prong of the Overland Campaign due to the
proximity of Lee’s army to Washington. The city had
already come under attack twice in the previous years, and it
would be disastrous for another attack to take place in an
election year. The river systems of Virginia presented other
obstacles, serving as defensive lines for Lee to hide behind
as well as forcing the Union army to either work around them
or find its way across them. The country was also heavily
forested, and the roads narrow and poorly kept. 3 The army
itself had issues as well, especially in the chain of command.
General Meade was unpopular with his officers, but was the
hero of Gettysburg. Benjamin Butler lacked military ability,
but wielded political influence. Ambrose Burnside also had
political influence, but refused to serve under Meade and
James Marshall-Cornwall, Grant as Military Commander (New York:
Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1970), 136.
2
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3
Marshall-Cornwall, Grant as Military Commander, 136.
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therefore acted as an independent entity rather than a reserve
for Meade’s army. Franz Sigel lacked military ability as
well, but his appointment had helped ensure that German
settlers in St. Louis would vote for Lincoln. 4 Short of one of
these men causing a serious mistake on the battlefield, Grant
was virtually powerless to replace them with more
competent commanders. So instead, he decided to rule his
subordinates with an iron fist, instructing them to come
straight to him during battle and to follow his instructions
rather than their own whims.
Too many mistakes had been made in earlier battles
on the part of flakey commanders, and Grant was keen that
they not be repeated in the future. He told his officers the
following:
I want you to discuss with me freely from time to
time the details of the orders given for the conduct of
a battle, and learn my views as fully as possible as to
what course should be pursued in all the contingencies which may arise. I expect to send you to the
critical points of the lines to keep me promptly
advised of what is taking place, and in cases of great
emergency, when new dispositions have to be made
on the instant, or it becomes suddenly necessary to
reinforce on command by sending to its aid troops
from another, and there is not time to communicate
with headquarters, I want you to explain my views to
commanders, and urge immediate action, looking to
4
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cooperation, without waiting for specific orders from
me. 5
By early April 1864, each of Grant’s commanders were
given instructions for the imminent campaign. These
instructions outlined separate directives and alternative
plans that could be implemented based on further discussion
with Grant or in case of emergency. Butler and Meade were
ordered to move out against Lee’s forces on May 4, while
Sherman was to move his 100,000 men against Johnston the
next day. 6 There would be no slowing down or turning back
for “Unconditional Surrender” Grant.
Critics of Grant’s methods in the first month of the
Overland Campaign often point out that other plans could
have been implemented to prevent the bloodshed. But Grant
was simply going off the information available at the time in
order to make the most tactically sound decisions. In his
biography of Grant, James Marshall-Cornwell argues that it
might have been more effective to weaken the Confederate
economy with a naval blockade and force a surrender
through civilian pressure, reminiscent of Winfield Scott’s
famed Anaconda Plan. This position would have been
strengthened with the Union’s control of the Mississippi,
which Grant had already one during his campaigns in the
West. 7 But such a blockade would have taken time that Grant
did not have to bargain with. Moreover, a stronger blockade
Horace Porter, Campaigning with Grant (New York: Century, 1897),
38.
6
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against Southern exports would have increased pressure on
Great Britain and France, both of which relied on Southern
cotton for their textile industries, to finally cave and support
the Confederacy.
Marshall-Conway also argues that the casualties at
the Battle of the Wilderness could have been avoided had
Grant “handled [General Philip H.] Sheridan’s Cavalry
Corps with more imagination,” and that, “had Grant pushed
on rapidly to Spotsylvania through the Wilderness on the
evening of 4 May… he would have beaten Lee in the race
for Richmond, and would have been able to fight him with
superior numbers in more open country.” 8 Sheridan’s
Cavalry Corps was a relatively recent invention; Grant had
formed them earlier in March in response to the lack of
coordination within Union cavalry units, who up to that point
had primarily acted as independent side-line fighters. The
Wilderness was the first test for the corps as a whole, so
Grant’s choice to put these men straight into the thick of
things can be construed as a suicidal waste of both men and
horses. Yet of all that battles that Grant fought in the Overland Campaign, it is Cold Harbor that his critics point to as
proof of his butcher-like brutality. Lieutenant-Colonel
Martin Thomas McMahon, writing a few years later in a
collection of first-hand war accounts, opens his criticism of
the battle with the following:
In the opinion of a majority of its survivors, the battle
of Cold Harbor should never have been fought. There
8
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was no military reason to justify it. It was the dreary,
dismal, bloody, ineffective close of the LieutenantGeneral’s first campaign with the Army of the
Potomac, and correspond in all its essential features
with what had preceded it. 9
It certainly does Grant no favors that this battle came
at the end of nearly an entire month of bloody fighting, with
heavy Union losses at both the Wilderness and Spotsylvania
and the month’s total casualties numbering over 60,000. 10
By Cold Harbor, the army was exhausted from constant
fighting and marching, and another battle did nothing to help
the matter. Artillerist Charles Wainwright wrote in his
journal, “I fear that the truth is that all the fight is gone out
of our men. Grant has used the army up, and will now have
to wait until its morale is restored before he can do
anything.” 11 This exhaustion caused delays in arrival for
certain units, and forced Grant to repeatedly push back the
assault, which historian Brooks Simpson has called “nothing
short of stupid.” 12 But if Grant had pushed forward and
ignored his men, the soldiers would not have had time to rest
after marching, and the commanders would have struggled
to organize the assault.
Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, eds. Robert Underwood Johnson
and Clarence Clough Buel, vol. 4 (New York: Century, 1888), 231.
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Once the assault was over, the controversy was not.
The dead, trapped between the two lines, were left to rot
among the wounded due to the fact that Grant and Lee could
not agree to a ceasefire and were unable to be retrieved.
Ernest Furgurson, who was not satisfied with other authors’
criticisms of Grant, opened his book on Cold Harbor by
referencing these abandoned men:
Never before and never again in the American Civil
War were so many wounded soldiers left so long to
suffer in plain sight of their comrades, their enemies,
and the birds of carrion. Never did generals so
blatantly place concern for their own reputations
above mercy for their soldiers lying dying in the
sun. 13
Grant was not solely to blame in this instance, but it has still
been used to bolster claims that he was a butcher. Grant may
have worded his letters to Lee differently, and maybe that
would have shortened the time he took to communicate. But
perhaps Lee still would have still stuck to his militaristic
formality and the discussions would have taken just as long.
Certainly some of these criticisms are valid. Still, Cold
Harbor was a perfect storm of mistakes on the part of both
Grant and his commanders, pressure from higher up forcing
Grant onward, horrible weather, and Lee taking advantage
of every tactical opportunity presented him.
Ernest B. Furgurson, Not War But Murder: Cold Harbor 1864 (New
York: Random House, 2001), 3.
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The Assault on Cold Harbor
While the fighting at Cold Harbor lasted from May 31 to
June 12, it is the disastrous assault on June 3 that newspapers
at the time and historians today point to for their charges of
butchery. Yet the events of the days prior are what led to the
bloody mess between the lines. Sheridan’s Cavalry Corps
first seized the crossroads at Cold Harbor on May 31, and
were ordered to hold it at all costs despite counterattacks
from Confederate forces under Robert Hoke. Union
reinforcements were on their way from the 6th Corps under
Horatio Wright, but in order to have them arrive on time,
they were forced to march for fifteen miles through the
night. 14 As the fighting continued into the next morning on
June 1, Sheridan’s forced held out for four hours until
Wright’s men arrived at 9 a.m. 15
Meanwhile, William Farrar Smith’s 18th Corps,
which has sat inactive since May 16, was ordered by Grant’s
chief of staff John Aaron Rawlins to move his men toward
New Castle Ferry. But when they arrived, they discovered
that Rawlins had made a fatal error: he sent them to the
wrong location. They were eight miles away, and men
dropped from heat exhaustion as the unit turned around to
make it in time for battle. They had no ammunition, but still
attacked when they arrived at 5 p.m. and even managed to
carry the first line of Confederate rifle pits with the 6th
Corps. 16 Though this fighting on June 1 inflicted losses of
Marshall-Cornwall, Grant as Military Commander, 173.
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16
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more than two thousand men between the two units, Union
forces managed to gain control of the roads to the James
River as well as key tactical ground, which the rebels failed
to take back in subsequent skirmishes. 17
As Grant and his staff set up their headquarters at
Bethesda church, the plan for the following days started to
take form. One of the primary concerns at this point was
encountering the rebels after they had already entrenched
themselves, which had been a continual problem during the
campaign. Accordingly, Grant wanted to move forward as
early as possible on June 2 to reach Confederate forces
before they had time to settle in. The subsequent battle was
intended to roll up the Confederate right flank and drive a
wedge between Lee and the Chickahominy River, with a
main thrust by the 18th, 6th, and 2nd Corps while the 9th and
5th would wheel up, flank the rebels, and destroy their
formations.
All five corps were on the line on June 2, but not on
time or in shape for the planned assault at five p.m. Winfield
Scott Hancock, with farther to march than other units, was
late to take his position on the left. Smith had struggled
mightily to arrive, and lacked the ammunition to be effective
in an assault. Perhaps remembering earlier battles such as the
Wilderness, where simply allowing units to fight when they
arrived led to confusion and destruction, Grant decided on
the fatal delay to allow his units time to prepare themselves
before the assault. He also made an uncharacteristic
judgment of Meade’s military ability, entrusting him with
17
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the next day’s assault. He also moved Wright’s corps to the
left, hoping to take advantage of what he saw as a weak spot
in the Confederate line. 18 As Grant later wrote in his
memoirs,
Before the removal of Wright’s corps from our right,
after dark on the 31st, the two lines, Federal and
Confederate, were so close together at that point that
either side could detect directly any movement made
by the other. Finding at daylight that Wright had left
his front, Lee evidently divined that he had gone to
our left. 19
Not only had Lee taken advantage of the evident delay in
hostilities and entrenched his men on their side of the
battlefield; he was also quick to adjust his forces and follow
the movements that Grant had failed to disguise.
Veteran soldiers had witnessed enough bloodshed to
recognize the chaos about to unfold. Horace Porter, one of
Grant’s staff officers, was delivering orders when he noticed
a rather peculiar sight:
As I came near one of the regiments which was
making preparations for the next morning’s assault,
I noticed that many of the soldiers had taken off their
coats… it was found that the men were calmly
Jean Edward Smith, Grant (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), 361.
Ulysses S. Grant, The Complete Personal Memoirs of Ulysses S. Grant
(Lexington, KY: ReadaClassic, 2010), 348.
18
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writing their names and home addresses on slips of
paper, and pinning them on the backs of their coats,
so that their dead bodies might be recognized upon
the field, and their fate made known to their families
at home. 20
At 4:30 on the morning on June 3, the units under Hancock,
Wright, and Smith dashed forward to strike at the center and
right-center of the Confederate defenses. This was the
battle’s largest body of troops exposed to heavy firepower,
as Confederate artillery and infantry fired round after round
into the approaching Union soldiers. One survivor referred
to it as having “the fury of the Wilderness musketry with the
thunder of the Gettysburg artillery superadded.” 21 Many
soldiers were forced to use the corpses of their comrades in
defense against the storm of bullets. 22
As Grant responded to dispatches at headquarters,
Meade continued to give shaky and contradictory orders to
his subordinates, unsure of whether to continue the assault.
At 11 a.m., Grant arrived on the front to witness the disaster
before him. Furious, and realizing that Meade had lost
control, he managed to call an end to the battle at 12:30 p.m.,
but both sides continued shelling out relentless artillery fire
for the next several days. 23 The assault on Cold Harbor was
over, at the cost of 1,500 Confederate lives and nearly five
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times as many Union. 24 Yet according to official War
Department figures, Cold Harbor was not even the deadliest
battle in the Overland Campaign, with a loss of 10,058
killed, wounded, or missing compared with the Wilderness’
13,948 and Spotsylvania’s 13,601. In total, from the first day
of the Wilderness on May 5 to the end of negotiations at Cold
Harbor on June 12, Union losses numbered 39,259. 25 But
unliked these other battles, both of which forced the rebel
army to retreat and the Union to gain critical tactical ground,
nothing was gained to make up for the losses sustained.
Causes of Disaster
While at a surface glance Cold Harbor seems like nothing
but an utter strategic failure on Grant’s part, the causes of the
disaster were not so simple. The Overland Campaign, which
had started four weeks earlier, was unprecedented in
American military history. At no point up to that time had
there ever been two armies on US soil continuously fighting
once another for such a length of time. Grant was worried
that this battle could be the last time he had Lee out in the
open and away from Richmond’s defenses, and was
determined to inflict a significant blow on rebel forces.
Grant, like those in Washington, did not a want a prolonged
siege of the Confederate capital. The political pressure he
faced certainly did not help the matter. While Union forces
had been gaining ground, many on Lincoln’s staff wanted
Grant to take Richmond as soon as possible, even as the
24
25
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bloody fighting showed that this would take longer than
expected. According to some figures, the war was costing
the Union $4 million per day. 26 So Grant felt forced to
continue fighting, to continue moving, to continue taking
ground in order to keep Lincoln from losing the election.
However, by the time of Cold Harbor, soldiers as
well as commanders were completely exhausted. The
weather compounded their fatigue, as Union soldiers in their
wool uniforms were unaccustomed to the sheer heat and
dustiness of Virginia summers. Lee’s men also had the
benefit of familiar terrain where they lived, traveled, and
fought, while Grant was looking at terra incognita. The
Confederate position enjoyed some natural strengths as well:
the right flank was covered by the valley of the
Chickahominy and the left flank rested on Totopotomoy
Creek. The ground, although level, was covered in swamps,
gullies, and thickets that limited the movement of
approaching soldiers. 27 Lee took advantage of the delay that
Grant took to entrench his forces, creating a seven-mile front
of interlocking trenches supported by artillery. Horace Porter
later recalled:
I have never before seen such extensive works
constructed with such magical rapidity… They are
intricate, zig-zagged lined within lines, lines
protecting flank of lines, lines built to enfilade an
opposing line, lines within which lies a battery which
26
27
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must keep silent… a maze and labyrinth of works
within works, and works without works, each laid out
with some definite design either of defense or
offense. 28
Confederate defenses were impregnable, and allowed rebel
forces to use their infantry and artillery in conjunction to
form the deadly volley of fire that some compared to the
sound of an erupting volcano.
The failures of Grant’s subordinates to cooperate or
give effective orders had just as strong an effect as his own
decisions or Lee’s position. By June 2, the Union command
structure was collapsing. Gouverneur K. Warren was
fighting with those below him, Meade and Burnside had
ceased communicating with one another like schoolchildren
(which led to Burnside refusing to send Meade
reinforcements), and Smith was still angry that Meade
refused to help him with ammunition. Meade also left his
corps commanders to plan their own advances, resulting in a
lack of coordination within the columns and failure to
undertake crucial reconnaissance. 29 When he did bother to
give orders, they did not list the time they were intended to
be carried out and lacked clear objectives or battlefield
boundaries. One of his orders to Smith, which was received
not long after midnight on June 2, vaguely read, “You will
make your dispositions to attack tomorrow morning on
General Wright’s right, and in conjunction with that officer’s
28
29
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attack. This attack should be made with your whole force
and as vigorously as possible.” 30 And in the heat of battle on
June 3, Meade failed again to issue effective orders, ignoring
logistics in favor of throwing men into the assault—the exact
charge that critics blame Grant for. In his account of the
battle a few years later, Smith recalled that
Later in the day I received a verbal order from
General Meade to make another assault, and that
order I refused to obey. I had carefully examined the
entire front of my line, and was convinced that no
assault could succeed that did not embrace a portion
of the works in ‘front of my right,’ where I was
powerless to make an attack. An assault under such
conditions I looked on as involving a wanton waste
of life. 31
Even after it was clear that his attack was a failure,
Meade considered renewing the assault. But rather than
making the decision for himself and asking Grant for his
opinion, Meade left it up to his subordinates to decide
whether to continue. Wright and Smith both told Meade that
their decision relied on that of others, and when Meade gave
orders for them to attack independently of one another, both
units remained in place rather than advancing. Grant made a
mistake in trusting Meade, but he should not be blamed for
Meade’s incompetence. Meade has been placed in charge of
30
31

Marshall-Cornwall, Grant as Military Commander, 174.
Johnson and Buel, Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, 4:227.
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the Army of the Potomac, and should have known his own
limitations as a commander.
Grant’s reputation was not helped by the fact that the
dead and wounded and lay trapped between the lines, but this
was due to Lee’s strict adherence to military protocol rather
than any butcher-like mentality on Grant’s part. Most of the
dead, as the numbers clearly demonstrate, were Union men.
But the firing did not calm down enough for a ceasefire to
even be considered until June 5. Grant, recognizing an
opportunity to help his dead and wounded men, immediately
wrote to Lee to request permission for unarmed men to
gather them during a ceasefire:
It is reported to me that there are wounded men,
probably of both armies, now lying exposed and
suffering between the lines occupied respectively by
the two armies. Humanity would dictate that some
provision should be made to provide against such
hardships. I would propose, therefore, that hereafter,
when no battle is raging, either party be authorized
to send to any point between the pickets or skirmish
lines, unarmed men bearing litters to pick up their
dead or wounded, without being fired upon by the
other party. Any other method, equally fair to both
parties, you may propose for meeting the end desired
will be accepted by me. 32

32
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Yet when Lee’s reply came the next day, it seemed that
militaristic formality would be prioritized over humanity. He
shot down Grant’s request, saying that casualties should only
be moved under a flag of truce. When Grant promised that
stretcher-bearers would be waving white flags, this was not
enough for the Confederate commander: he wanted Grant to
send a flag of truce in order to request permission for a flag
of truce. 33 It took until the evening of June 6 for Lee to accept
Grant’s plan. He allowed orderlies to be sent out from 8 p.m.
to 10 p.m., in a manner nearly identical to the method that
Grant had initially proposed, but the time had already passed
when Union headquarters received Lee’s letter near
midnight. By the time Grant was finally able to get the
bodies off the battlefield on June 7, all but two of the
wounded had perished. 34
If Grant had been a senseless butcher, as those who
point to Cold Harbor would have it, he would not have cared
for the suffering of his men who laid dying, or showed regret
for his actions. But he did. Captain Samuel H. Beckwith
recalled Grant’s depression following the battle, telling him
that “the hardest part of this General business is the
responsibility for the loss of one’s men. I can see no other
way out of it, however; we’ve got to keep at them. But it is
hard, very hard, to see all those brave fellows killed and
wounded. It means aching hearts back home.” 35
Simpson, Ulysses S. Grant, 328.
Chernow, Grant, 407.
35
Samuel H. Beckwith, “With Grant in the Wilderness, By His
‘Shadow’; Chief Cipher Operator Samuel H. Beckwith, Who Was So
Constantly in Attendance Upon the Union General as to Earn That
33
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Other commanders and members of Grant’s staff
report similar encounters in the days after the battle. In his
own memoirs, where it must have taken great courage to
admit his feelings and failures to the public in such a candid
manner, he wrote,
I have always regretted that the last assault at Cold
Harbor was ever made. I might say the same thing of
the assault of the 22d of May, 1863, at Vicksburg. At
Cold Harbor no advantage whatever was gained to
compensate for the heavy loss we sustained. Indeed,
the advantages other than those of relative losses,
were on the Confederate side. 36
Grant accepted the blame put upon him for the casualties at
Cold Harbor, even if he was not entirely to blame. And if he
were such a barbaric commander, he would have paid no
heed to the exhaustion and poor conditions of his men. He
recognized how his men were suffering when they arrived,
and in order to help them, ironically ordered the delay that
would kill so many of them.
Likewise, if Grant were a senseless murderer, he
likely would have pressed forward with the attack without
delay. While this would have prevented Lee from strengthening his left or building his maze of trenches, Smith’s men
would have had no ammunition, and the soldiers would have
Nickname, Reminisces of That Historic Battle,” The New York Times,
May 31, 1914.
36
Grant, Personal Memoirs, 353.
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had been in no condition to fight. Moreover, Cold Harbor
was not even as great a defeat as critics try to suggest.
Historians such as J. F. C. Fuller and Bruce Catton point out
that Grant’s armies actually lost smaller percentages of their
men in battle when compared with other Civil War generals,
and the losses at Cold Harbor were similar in number to
other battles such as Gettysburg. 37 While these losses appear
larger because the Confederates lost so little and held their
ground, the battle was still in keeping with the objectives of
the Overland Campaign. Lee’s forces were unable to go on
the offensive at Cold Harbor, and the continual fighting that
followed forced their retreat to Richmond, allowing them to
be sieged and eventually to surrender at Appomattox.

37
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PITTSBURGH’S EXPLOSIVE MYSTERY:
A NEW HOLISTIC STUDY OF THE
ALLEGHENY ARSENAL TRAGEDY
Ethan J. Wagner | Mercyhurst University
On September 18, 1862, the Pittsburgh Daily Post reported
on what it dubbed “the most terrible calamity which has ever
befallen our city” just one day prior. 1 Yet the denizens of
Pittsburgh’s Lawrenceville neighborhood were not the only
ones faced with tragedy. For most of the country, what
transpired on the banks of the Allegheny River paled in
comparison with what was taking place to the south. On the
deadliest single day in American history, the Battle of
Antietam became a crucial juncture in the Civil War—it was
the Union victory that prompted Abraham Lincoln to issue
the Emancipation Proclamation—and was bound to capture
most headlines. As the nation was bombarded with stories
from the battlefield, other occurrences on that day have
either lacked sufficient coverage or remained neglected in
mainstream Civil War discourse.
In her recent book Gunpowder Girls: The True
Stories of Three Civil War Tragedies, Tanya Anderson has
The author would like to thank Dr. Benjamin Scharff for his guidance in
bringing this project to life, as well as Dr. John Olszowka for his
assistance during the editing process. Additionally, special thanks go out
to Mr. James Wudarczyk and Mr. Tom Powers of the Lawrenceville
Historical Society for their hospitality and willingness to provide
resources during the early stages of this research.
1
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lamented that September 17, 1862 was the deadliest day of
the Civil War on two fronts. The first, Antietam, has been
widely documented. But the little-known explosions at
Lawrenceville’s Allegheny Arsenal, which resulted in the
tragic death of seventy-eight young workers, deserves a
more proper study. As the worst civilian disaster of the war,
its neglect in the national memory proves both surprising and
regretful. 2 The scenes of horror outlined in local newspapers
the next day described three consecutive explosions around
2 p.m., ripping apart the federal munitions laboratories and
killing dozens of female laborers. Onlookers were only left
with the sight of charred building remains and burning
corpses, understandably suggesting “an appalling sight.” 3
The sparse literature that does exist on the Allegheny
Arsenal has only considered the historical record from the
day of the explosions onward. As a matter of course, it has
neglected to examine how prior events leading up to the
blasts might have shaped the day’s events, which historian
Arthur B. Fox has described as among “the most renowned
in Pittsburgh history.” 4 Thus, the present study aims at a
more holistic examination of the circumstances leading up
to the explosions and how they might explain why this
tragedy occurred—as well as who should be held
responsible.
2
Tanya Anderson, Gunpowder Girls: The True Stories of Three Civil
War Tragedies (Kansas City, MO: Quindara Press, 2016), 44.
3
“Appalling Disaster,” Daily Pittsburgh Gazette and Commercial
Journal, September 18, 1862.
4
Arthur B. Fox, Pittsburgh During the American Civil War, 1860-1865
(Chicora, PA: Mechling Bookbindery, 2002), 118.
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Contemporary scholarship suggests that the arsenal
disaster can most likely be attributed to a combination of
negligence and misfortune, although the precise nature of its
causation remains controversial. Narratives have also tended
to dismiss the possibility of intentional wrongdoing. A broad
approach to the story must consider historical realities that
others have failed to properly examine, such as the
established record of Confederate sabotage throughout the
Civil War, local political tensions and Copperhead activity,
and Pittsburgh’s strategic significance. Ultimately, these
considerations reveal that, while intentional wrongdoing was
at least possible, the evidence suggests that the Allegheny
Arsenal disaster can chiefly be attributed to the negligence
of the DuPont Company, rather than that of arsenal
commander John Symington and his associates.
Background on Allegheny Arsenal
Existing research on the explosions has centered around the
two major investigations undertaken in their aftermath. Two
days after the disaster, the city coroner gathered a panel of
locals to collect eyewitness testimony. 5 All agreed that the
blasts likely originated from the roadway outside the
laboratories, as barrels of gunpowder were constantly being
delivered into the buildings for use in munitions production.
Most of those interviewed stated that rules were clearly
Tom Powers and James Wudarczyk, interview by the author,
Lawrenceville, PA, June 5, 2020. Ironically, the original transcripts of
this investigation were destroyed in a fire at the country courthouse in
1882, leaving the reports from the Daily Post as the only surviving
accounts of the proceedings.
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posted, including directives that spilled gunpowder was
always to be collected and disposed of. Witness Joseph
Frick, who was delivering these barrels at the time, testified
that it was customary to unload and distribute powder on the
porch, allowing piles of excess to accumulate on the
roadways outside in the days prior to the explosions. In
addition, the compelling story of worker Rachel Dunlap,
who reported seeing a blaze appear underneath Frick’s
delivery wagon just prior to the initial blast, corroborated the
likely epicenter of the incident. 6
Consensus began to fragment when others refuted
these claims, arguing that they never saw powder spilled
outside. Meanwhile, civilian arsenal superintendent
Alexander McBride assured the jury that he swiftly
reprimanded those who did not comply with the directive to
not sweep loose powder onto the roadway, as he even hired
workers whose sole job was to ensure that this did not
happen. Rather, McBride stressed that he reported to his
superiors on numerous occasions his concern regarding the
DuPont Company supplying gunpowder in defective leaking
barrels with routinely ill-fitting lids. 7
The coroner’s investigation settled on the theory that
the blasts began on the roadway, as loose powder somehow
accumulated and sparked fire. However, questions remained
concerning the nature of the road itself. Frick further testified
that he remarked to himself on several occasions how
“The Arsenal Catastrophe — Coroner’s Investigation,” Daily Post
(Pittsburgh), September 20, 1862.
7
“The Arsenal Catastrophe.”
6
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uneven the road was and how one day an accident would
surely result from shaken gunpowder. A Mr. K. Bracken
substantiated this testimony, as he swore to have laid the
stone for the road, which contained a mixture of freestone
and was therefore highly susceptible to sparking if struck
correctly by the iron of a wheel or horse’s shoe. 8 This
seemed to carry great validity, as stone quarry expert
William Baxter related how “the stone on the roadway at the
arsenal grounds was as dangerous for striking fire as any I
know.” 9
The jury panel concluded twelve days after the
tragedy, where the majority opinion ruled that the explosion
was caused by arsenal commander Col. John Symington,
superintendent Alexander McBride, and other top
associates, whose neglect resulted in unsafe conditions. Of
arguably greater significance was the fact that this decision
was not unanimous, as two jurors dissented, preferring to
clear Symington and instead blame the incident solely on the
negligence of McBride and other arsenal higher-ups. Both
verdicts failed to officially implicate the DuPont Company
for any direct, punishable involvement. 10
Dissatisfied with the findings that blamed him, Col.
Symington called for his own military investigation to be
conducted by the Ordinance Department. He played a
critical role in this inquiry, correcting the missteps
“The Arsenal Disaster — Continuation of the Coroner’s Investigation,”
Daily Post (Pittsburgh), September 23, 1862.
9
“The Arsenal Disaster.”
10
“The Coroner’s Jury on the Arsenal Catastrophe: The Verdict — Two
Jurors Dissent,” Daily Post (Pittsburgh), September 29, 1862.
8
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committed in the coroner’s investigation where crossexamination was inexplicably neglected in favor of witness
depositions. 11 However, determining a definitive answer
proved difficult, as key eyewitnesses changed their stories or
were not invited to attend. For instance, Frick complained of
having been asked so many questions that he could no longer
think straight, and Rachel Dunlap’s story went unheard, as
women were precluded from participating in military affairs
at that time. 12 Furthermore, Symington only summoned
witnesses who he could either discredit or were favorable to
his cause. 13
Ultimately, the military tribunal looked more favorably on Symington. Those assembled made several
commendatory statements concerning his conduct, relaying
how he “took every care and precaution… to guard against
accidents of every kind.” 14 As a result, he was surely pleased
with the ruling that he had no reasonable basis on which to
be blamed. That said, he also had reason for dissatisfaction
with the caveat to that same opinion, as the tribunal
concluded by suggesting that “the cause of the explosion

Tod Abele, “Allegheny Arsenal Explosion,” Battlefield Pennsylvania,
DVD, hosted by Brady Crytzer (Camp Hill, PA: Pennsylvania Cable
Network, 2017).
12
Transcript of the Proceedings of a Court of Inquiry to Investigate an
Explosion at the Allegheny Arsenal Lab on September 17, 1862,
Convened on October 15, 1862 under Order 288 of the Adjutants
General Office, Record Group 153, Court Martial Records, National
Archives, Mid-Atlantic Region, Philadelphia, 50.
13
James Wudarczyk, Until the Morning Cometh: Civil War Era
Pittsburgh (Apollo, PA: Closson Press, 3012), 130.
14
Transcript, 101-02.
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could not be satisfactorily ascertained.” 15 While the need to
get Allegheny Arsenal back up and running surely played
into why the case was closed so quickly, Symington likely
remained bitter.
Primarily referencing these two investigations, the
present debate has leaned toward the idea that the military
inquiry’s findings appear valid. The most readily accepted
theory remains that some source of iron sparked the road,
igniting accumulated piles of gunpowder and causing a
series of explosions. The resultant belief has maintained that
negligence on the parts of Symington, McBride, other
officials, and the DuPont Company all played a relatively
equal role in an accidental tragedy. 16 Yet this consensus has
largely looked past significant components of the story,
which challenge the idea that sabotage could not possibly be
in play or that DuPont should not be more aggressively
examined.
Confederates and Copperheads
An established record of Confederate sabotage throughout
the war places it within reason to consider that something
more sinister might have been to blame at Allegheny
Arsenal. The South’s agrarian society and paucity of
manufacturing centers forced the Confederacy to resort to
more unorthodox methods to gain some leverage against its
industrial disadvantage. This came in the form of
Transcript, 101-02.
Tom Powers and James Wudarczyk, “Behind the Scenes of the
Allegheny Arsenal Explosion,” Pennsylvania Legacies 13, no. 1/2
(2013): 45.
15
16
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government-financed subversion. 17 The Confederacy was so
committed to this strategy that President Jefferson Davis
approved the establishment of an official “Band of Deconstructionists” by 1863, solely dedicated to undermining the
Union war effort. 18 If sabotage was undertaken prior to the
Confederate president himself signing off a new force to
carry out attacks, such an outcome at Allegheny Arsenal
would have been ideal.
The Central Intelligence Agency’s 2017 report on
intelligence during the Civil War documents a secret session
of the Confederate Congress held in February 1864. At this
meeting, a bill was passed to finance and reward acts of
sabotage against the Union carried out by Southern
sympathizers who had gained asylum in Canada. Moreover,
these agents’ activities stretched as far south as New York,
Ohio, and various cities in proximity to Pittsburgh,
suggesting that more local sabotage could have occurred. 19
Evidence suggests that sabotage efforts were not merely
carried out by rogue radicals. Rather, there was a systemic,
premeditated plan at the highest levels of the Confederate
government, making it reasonable to question whether the
only saboteurs in the North were those unlucky enough to be
caught.
Mark K. Ragan, Confederate Saboteurs: Building the Hunley and
Other Secret Weapons of the Civil War (College Station, TX: Texas
A&M University Press, 2015), 1.
18
Ragan, Confederate Saboteurs, 134.
19
Central Intelligence Agency, Intelligence in the Civil War, drafted and
prepared by Thomas Allen (Washington, D.C.: Office of Public Affairs,
2017), 43.
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Other well-known incidents of Confederate subversion included those in Missouri, as the prevalence of the
so-called “boat-burners” made St. Louis a hotbed of activity.
By 1864, the Union had commissioned personnel to combat
subversion and track down suspected spies. 20 Federal
discoveries of such acts eventually became more routine
with Provost Marshal James H. Baker’s sleuthing in St.
Louis. He reported in multiple letters to Assistant Secretary
of War Charles Anderson Dana how an extensive list had
been compiled of men known to be employed by the
Confederacy to “destroy government property and
steamboats” on the Mississippi, leading Dana to promise
“immediate attention to the matter.” 21 Similarly, concern of
widespread sabotage was recognized elsewhere, as several
other Union officials, such as Major and acting Judge
Advocate General A. A. Hosmer, reviewed the list of names
and further added how “the subject is regarded as one of
great importance.” 22
From the nineteen known saboteurs detained in St.
Louis alone, it was determined that over seventy steamboats
had been destroyed by Confederate-allied or sympathetic
agents, many of whom were sent at the behest of Jefferson
Davis. Edward Frazor’s confession to having met with Davis
and Confederate Secretary of War James Seddon in
Richmond demonstrates the length to which such acts would
receive government support. According to Frazor, Davis
CIA, Intelligence in the Civil War, 17-18.
“Sabotage of the Sultana: Provost Marshal J. H. Baker’s Report on the
Boat-Burners,” The Boat-Burners, Civil War St. Louis, 2001.
22
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20
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personally offered him a sum of $400,000 to oversee
sabotage efforts throughout the North. 23 The prospect of
government-backed financial incentive had already been
established, but the fact that Davis further urged saboteurs to
cause as much damage as possible makes it likely that
pockets of activity could spring up anywhere, at any time.
Eventually, rebels such as Joseph W. Tucker began
receiving money from the Confederate government based on
the price of the damages inflicted. A confidential letter
between Tucker and Davis outlined the state’s desire for
more direct attacks on Union infrastructure, specifically
armies, arsenals, and depots of stores as a means of
“paralyzing the military strength of the federal government.” 24 While this letter was not written until March 1864,
Pittsburgh contained every type of Union infrastructure that
Davis outlined as preferred targets.
In addition to examining Confederate sabotage with
respect to intentional wrongdoing at Allegheny Arsenal,
there also existed rampant political discord and violence in
the Pittsburgh area. Allegheny County and neighboring
Washington County were teeming with tensions prior to and
throughout the war. Political polarization was especially
visible in downtown Pittsburgh, beginning with Abraham
Lincoln’s initial bid for the presidency in 1860. Lincoln’s
campaign was a harbinger of war and greatly divided people
in their opinions on the Union more broadly. Local
“Sabotage of the Sultana.”
“Joseph W. Tucker and the Boat-Burners,” The Boat-Burners, Civil
War St. Louis, 2001.
23
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Presbyterian minister Richard Lea said as much in a sermon
following the arsenal explosions, recalling his conversation
with congregant Agnes Davidson, who made a political
pledge to “no longer be a secessionist from the government
of God.” 25 The creation of an “us versus them” mentality
suggests that the demonization of the Confederacy, at least
among some Pittsburghers, was powerful.
City newspapers further catered to a split political
base. While Allegheny County generally leaned Republican,
citizens could expect to read entirely different accounts of
presidential politics depending on their chosen source. The
Daily Gazette strongly backed Lincoln, while the Pittsburgh
Post advocated for Democrats and states’ rights. 26 Best
evidenced in the coverage of Lincoln’s stop through the city
en route to his inauguration in 1861, both the Gazette and the
Post agreeably reported on how the Federal Street train
station was crowded in anticipation of the president-elect’s
arrival. However, the Post relayed that the onset of rain had
left the platform deserted, while the Gazette apparently saw
thousands who eagerly remained. Allegheny County, which
Lincoln proclaimed the “banner county of the state, if not of
the whole Union” in his attempt to win over Southern
sympathizers, clearly was not marked by partisan unity. 27
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Copperheads, or Northern Democrats who opposed
the Civil War, later arose in and around Pittsburgh stemming
from Lincoln’s stance on slavery, conscription, and states’
rights policies. Local Republicans accused Democrats of
disloyalty and treason; as a result, violence spread into
neighboring Washington County. 28 Pittsburgh journalist Len
Barcousky explains that the borough of Burgettstown in
Washington County was a “nest” of such activity by 1863.
While the region became a hotbed of Southern-sympathizing
Copperheads, the true nature of that sympathy was often less
“secessionist” and more in favor of a negotiated end to the
war and the preservation of slavery. 29 Though Barcousky
only describes what was occurring in 1863, the presence of
similar beliefs can be presumed just one year earlier,
especially given the public anti-Lincoln sentiment among
many in Allegheny County.
Washington County Copperheads were not all
motivated by the singular desire for treason and bloodshed.
Rather, many were simply resolute in their perceived need
to defend traditional republican values, social order, the
Constitution, and the Union. 30 These people of the rural
North were so used to having agency over their daily lives
that they could not fathom the idea of being told by the
government to take up arms and fight alongside Black men
Fox, Pittsburgh During the American Civil War, 201.
Barcousky, “Eyewitness 1863: Civil War draft debate heats up
Washington Co.,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette (September 15, 2013).
30
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West Virginia University, 2012), 315.
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for a cause which had little effect on them, if at all. The
thought of giving in to such requests from the federal
government presented the equally appalling prospects of a
more structured system of authority which would surely
attempt to ruin their lives. 31 For the citizens of Washington
County and in other areas throughout the North, conscription
violated what they believed to be a cornerstone of the
American republic: volunteerism over coercion. 32
Copperhead ideological motivation aside, there also
appeared legitimate reason to believe that significant
violence might erupt. As the Daily Pittsburgh Gazette and
Commercial Journal reported, such “excitement” did occur
in Washington County on at least one known occasion. In an
article from August 1863, witnesses recounted a “war like
demonstration” in Burgettstown. Copperhead demonstrators
lashed out at Union cavalry units passing through, to the
point that some sort of “difficulty” occurred, as pistol shots
rang out and peace had to be restored. The article also cited
the demonstrators’ disdain for all things Union, relaying how
“it was evident that the presence of the United States uniform
and flag was distasteful to them,” and how protestors were
seen adorned in Copperhead and Butternut breast pins. 33
Robert M. Sandow, Deserter Country: Civil War Opposition in the
Pennsylvania Appalachian (New York: Fordham University Press,
2009), 59.
32
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33
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Motive for the attack surely had to extend beyond the
cursory concept of wanting to derail the Union war effort.
There were numerous cities of great strategic and symbolic
importance to the North during the war, such as New York,
Boston, Philadelphia, and Washington, D.C. Yet Pittsburgh
was also critical. From the start, the rapid secession of states
just south of Pennsylvania took Northerners by surprise, and
they were quicky overtaken by paranoia. This appeared
particularly true in Pittsburgh, as city officials recognized
the potential for outside threat, and the local Committee of
Public Safety issued a rallying cry in 1861 to “keep a sharp
lookout for traitors.” 34 Considering that Pittsburgh was not
much farther from the border than Sharpsburg, Maryland,
locals had to wonder if their city was next to witness a major
battle, especially with a federal arsenal in operation
nearby. 35
This concern was heightened by the perception that
government officials shared equal concern over the city’s
importance and vulnerability. The War Department went on
to record that its intelligence suggested Pittsburgh might be
a logical target, calling it a “vital Union point.” 36
Meanwhile, reporters fueled the hysteria by construing a
story of how the city was “in imminent danger of rebel
Robert C. Plumb and George Pressly McClelland, Your Brother in
Arms: A Union Soldier’s Odyssey (Columbia, MO: University of
Missouri Press, 2011), 2.
35
“Allegheny Arsenal Explosion and the Creation of Public Memory,”
National Archives at Philadelphia, National Archives, August 15, 2016.
36
George Swetnam, “Thirty Days of Panic,” Western Pennsylvania
Historical Magazine 51, no. 4 (1968): 334.
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attack.” 37 In fact, the city remained in a constant state of
vulnerability, as the War Department found itself
preoccupied trying to calm the fears of attack in Washington
while simultaneously trying to supply the front lines with
sufficient forces to sustain the fight. In consequence,
Pittsburgh had only a thin staff of professional soldiers.
Considering Pittsburghers had been so instrumental in
creating the munitions at Allegheny Arsenal used to kill
those supposedly coming for revenge, many believed that
their involvement made them more pronounced targets. 38
Such paranoia and defensive actions were justified,
as Pittsburgh’s manufacturing proved instrumental in
sustaining the Union war effort. None of its industries were
more critical than Allegheny Arsenal, which singlehandedly
produced or contributed around ten percent of all cartridges
used by Union forces in the Western Theater. 39 However, the
most important statistic in considering Pittsburgh as a
possible Confederate target was the Fort Pitt Foundry’s
production, in coordination with Allegheny Arsenal, of sixty
percent of the heavily artillery used by Union forces. 40 It
stands to reason that a good site for any Confederate advance
into the Union should be in the place where such a high
volume of material was being furnished and a strong
Copperhead base already resided.
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March 31, 2016.
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Pittsburgh would have also been an attractive target
for Southern attack because of its strategically significant
physical geography. The city’s proximity to the pivotal
border states made it an easy target to conceivably access.
Not far from the Mason-Dixon line, this region had its share
of both pro- and anti-Lincoln sentiment. With the South in
ruins and well-stocked Pennsylvania farms and factories
nearby, it seemed only logical that Pittsburgh might be
targeted. 41 Since the Confederacy would have been eager to
entertain the prospect of pillaging these Northern resources,
Pittsburgh could truly have been called a critical “border
city.”
Additionally, Pittsburgh’s geographic features made
it crucial junction for Union supply lines at the midpoint
between east and west, where advantages in place, labor,
capital, and manufacturing coalesced to produce something
extraordinary. As Samuel Durant asserted in his History of
Allegheny Co., Pennsylvania from 1876, Pittsburgh served
as a natural gateway, not only via its three rivers, but also
because nearly all major railways had to converge at its
terminals. Truly, as Durant said of this city, “a thorough and
systematic development of all its resources, natural and
acquired, cannot fail to make this point permanently one of
the greatest manufacturing and commercial inland centers in
America.” 42 Considering that Allegheny was one of the
Union’s premier arsenals, the city’s ability to mediate a twoBarcousky, Civil War Pittsburgh, 10-11.
Samuel Durant, History of Allegheny Co., Pennsylvania (Philadelphia:
L. H. Everts & Co., 1876), 101; George H. Thurston, Allegheny County’s
Hundred Years (Pittsburgh: A. A. Anderson & Son, 1888).
41
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front war effort made it worthwhile for the Confederacy to
consider targeting. 43
Colonel John Symington
Given the record of Confederate sabotage along with the
city’s significance, Pittsburghers had reason to suspect
something deliberate behind the Allegheny Arsenal
explosion. They had even more reason to pin commander
Col. John Symington as a likely suspect. Locals knew of his
familial connections to the South, with his wife hailing from
the slaveholding border state of Maryland, his son joining
the Confederate Army, and his daughter marrying
Confederate General William Boggs and sporting a Southern
rosette to Sunday church services. However, residents did
not know that he had previously signed a letter of
recommendation to help one of his wife’s relatives gain
admission to West Point—a relative who happened to be
named George Pickett and later led one of the most infamous
Confederate charges of the entire Civil War at Gettysburg. 44
Ultimately, Symington’s record, and that of his
closest associates, must speak for itself. From the time he
first arrived at Allegheny Arsenal in 1857, he never
embodied the persona of a radical, treasonous mastermind.
Rather, his appointment was more intended to be a laid-back
Edward M. McKeever, “Earlier Lawrenceville,” Western
Pennsylvania Historical Magazine 5, no. 4 (1922): 280-82.
44
James Wudarczyk, “Explosion at the Allegheny Arsenal Rocks
Pittsburgh,” History Net, November 20, 2018; “Census Record —
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population schedule, NARA microfilm publication M653 (Washington,
D.C.: National Archives and Records Administration, n.d.).
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retirement position where he, at the age of sixty-five, could
serve out his final assignment to cap off an otherwise
pristine, forty-plus year record of military service. This was
especially significant considering he had already held prior
appointments at federal arsenals in Washington, D.C., St.
Louis, and Harpers Ferry. 45 While Pittsburgh offered an
appealing target, if Symington wanted to carry out a major
act of sabotage, it would have made far more sense to launch
an attack during his appointment in the even higher-profile
capital.
Symington lost the trust of many Pittsburghers
before the war even began, as his involvement in what came
to be known as the “gun incident” fueled an initial wave of
rumors. Following orders issued at the behest of Secretary of
War John B. Floyd in 1860, Symington worked to oversee
the shipment of vast stores of artillery from Allegheny to
other forts throughout the South. Pittsburghers were right to
be outraged by this blatant attempt of Floyd’s, the former
governor of Virginia and a Southern sympathizer, to allocate
resources to his Southern friends on the eve of a looming
war. Yet they were entirely incorrect in scapegoating
Symington for nearly allowing this to happen. 46 While
history has generally not been kind to the “just following
orders” excuse, it does seem justified in this instance.
Symington can further be ruled out as an intentional
saboteur due to his record of taking swift action against any
Todd Abele, “Allegheny Arsenal Explosion.”
Fox, Pittsburgh During the American Civil War, 13, 104; Barcousky,
Civil War Pittsburgh, 25.
45
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dangerous activity at Allegheny Arsenal. Just under a year
prior to the disaster, he wrote to his superior in Washington,
General James W. Ripley, explaining his decision to fire
much of the arsenal staff. As Symington reported, matches
were discovered near packed munitions that were awaiting
shipment. After what he called the “strictest investigation,”
an inability to locate a single culprit required that he dismiss
the area’s teenage male workforce, and he resolved from
then on to hire only girls. 47 As researcher John Carnprobst
suggests, boys were often more interested in playing with
weapons of war than in making them. 48 It stands to reason
that had Symington been sympathetic to the Confederacy, it
would have made far more sense to keep the unproductive
and dangerous boys on staff to either coincidentally cause an
explosion or otherwise impede production.
Symington’s testimony and actions both before and
after the disaster, as well as the vote of confidence from
those closest to him, definitively rules out his intentional
involvement. Less than two months prior to the explosions,
he made his intentions clear that he wanted nothing more
than to retire from active duty. In a letter to War Department
higher-up General Edward D. Townsend, Symington
formally submitted a request to step away from supervision
John Symington, “Letter from Colonel John Symington to General
James W. Ripley,” Allegheny Arsenal Records, National Archives and
Records Administration, Mid-Atlantic, Philadelphia, October 2, 1861;
quoted in Powers and Wudarczyk, “Behind the Scenes of the Allegheny
Arsenal Explosion.”
48
John L Carnprobst,” Tragedy at the U.S. Allegheny Arsenal,” Blue &
Gray Magazine, 1985, 29.
47

109

Wagner
at Allegheny Arsenal. 49 The fact that this request was denied
by senior military officials speaks both to his trustworthiness
and that his decades-long record of professionalism made it
unthinkable that he could have had anything to do with what
later transpired.
Under oath at the coroner’s investigation, multiple
witnesses confirmed that Symington played the role of hero
at the time of the blasts, coordinating rescue efforts and
consoling victims. 50 Even arsenal superintendent Alexander
McBride, whose own daughter Kate perished in the disaster,
personally vouched that Symington never did anything to
jeopardize lives or equipment at the arsenal and took every
reasonable precaution to avoid accident. 51 This plays an
important role in Symington’s defense, as McBride—a
civilian who had nothing to lose by pointing the finger and
every reason to be angry with Symington, whose leadership
potentially resulted in the death of his daughter—declined to
offer condemnation. Moreover, Symington was the one with
everything to lose by calling for the military investigation,
as a negative result promised to destroy his career.
Prior to the explosions, McBride repeatedly
complained about the DuPont Company’s practice of
reusing wooden delivery barrels and storing dry powder in
warm conditions. This practice, McBride explained, caused
Edward D. Townsend, “Edward D. Townsend to Colonel James
Symington, August 23, 1862,” Letters Received at the Allegheny
Arsenal, Records of the Chief of Ordinance, RG 156, National Archives
and Records Administration, Mid-Atlantic Region, Philadelphia.
50
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(Pittsburgh), September 20, 1862.
51
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expansion and cracks in the barrels, and allowed powder to
easily sift through and fall to the ground. 52 This concern was
only heightened by the stone road’s susceptibility to
sparking against the constant force of iron-hoofed delivery
horses, which was established in the early stages of both
investigations. 53 Symington testified to never having been
told of powder being furnished in such defective barrels and
remarked how the containers had only ever been returned to
DuPont at the company’s request. 54 Furthermore, one must
also wonder what Union military inquirer would possibly
want to anger DuPont, given the company’s importance to
the nation’s infrastructure. As the largest gunpowder
manufacturer for the Northern war effort, any interruption to
the supply chain due to prolonged safety investigations
would have risked serious setbacks on the battlefield. 55
DuPont looks even worse when one considers that
the same type of disaster was not exclusive to Allegheny
Arsenal. DuPont-supplied munitions laboratories suffered
no less than eleven explosions throughout the war, resulting
in more than one hundred deaths. 56 While none were nearly
as deadly as that which occurred at Allegheny, problems
Anderson, Gunpowder Girls, 53-54.
Marylynne Pitz, “Allegheny Arsenal Explosion: Pittsburgh’s Worst
Day During the Civil War,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, September 12,
2012.
54
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55
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Explosion,” 51.
56
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were rampant across the country. In each of these separate
cases, the prevalence of worker complains regarding foolish
safety practices and the disastrous aftermath shows that what
occurred in Lawrenceville also happened elsewhere to
varying degrees. While most of these explosions were later
determined to be the result of worker negligence, the
consequences of lax safety oversight should have made
DuPont realize the dangers of cutting corners with recycled
barrels and ill-fitting lids at Allegheny Arsenal.
The notion of intentional malice at Allegheny
Arsenal as early as 1862 is also questionable. The first
documented evidence of Confederate sabotage comes from
early 1863, perhaps suggesting that the war’s escalation
drove the South to greater desperation and took to
government-sanctioned subversion only after the arsenal
exploded. Moreover, the fact that Copperhead frustration in
Washington County was primarily over forced conscription
and the specter of having to fight alongside Black men likely
only became a violence-provoking issue after the
Emancipation Proclamation and Conscription Act in 1863.
Lincoln’s decision to shift the war from a push for
reunification to a crusade for abolition only further damaged
his relationship with the formerly moderate Copperheads. 57
While factors at play outside of Pittsburgh and the
possibility of intentional wrongdoing require a more
thorough examination, the historical record shows that the
DuPont Company deserves the principal blame for the
tragedy at Allegheny Arsenal. Symington ended up a victim
57
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of this tragedy himself. For a man who graduated near the
top of his class at West Point in 1815, enjoyed a long military
career, and did not have disaster visit him in his mid-sixties,
the only crime committed was by the investigators who
tarnished his legacy and left him to retire in disgrace. 58
Symington was subsequently relieved of his command, went
on leave of absence for about a year, was briefly reassigned
to a Washington shipyard, then retired. He spent the last few
months of his life distrusted and forgotten, dying in 1864. 59
The scenes of horror at Allegheny Arsenal presented
a lesson in the newfound nature of war. It showed that a strict
demarcation between battlefield and home front could no
longer exist, as the strife did not distinguish between male
combatants and innocent teenage girls. 60 The conflict
required that the military quickly put the tragedy to rest,
surreally symbolized by the disposal of the arsenal’s charred
remains in the Allegheny River and the rebuilding efforts
undertaken immediately after the explosions. The real shame
is that the women who died were patriots as much as their
male counterparts on the battlefield, but remain forgotten. 61
Unsurprisingly, few of the children who flock to the
playground at Arsenal Park today, or who attend Arsenal
Middle School next door, know of the events that transpired
around them.
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60
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